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Joel Fichaud*

Pensions:
A Primer For Lawyers

I. Introduction
This paper has two objectives: first to describe the elements of a
pension plan and, secondly, to illustrate the disproportion between
the employee's stake in a pension and his control over the pension
plan. The paper is concerned only with private pension plans, which
covered over one-third of the Canadian work force in 1970.1 It must
be borne in mind, however, that many pensioned employees, for
2
example, seventy percent in Nova Scotia, belong to public plans.
Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, Saskatchewan and the Dominion have
enacted minimum standards for private pension plans. As the
statutes are substantially identical, this paper refers only to the
Federal Pension Benefits Standards Act, 3 which applies to
undertakings in the federal jurisdiction. The pensions of Nova
Scotians not in the federal jurisdiction are regulated only by the
Income Tax Act, 4 which specifies the standards required of pension
*Joel Fichaud, B.A., L.L.B. Dalhousie 1975, graduate student Harvard Law
School.
1. Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1970 (Catalogue 74-401. Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1972) at 8.
2. Id., at 11, chart 2. The following statutes are relevant: British North America
Act, R.S.C. 1970 (App.) No. 5, s. 94A; Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c.
C-5.; Old Age Security Act, R.S.C 1970, c. 0-6.; Public Service Superannuation
Act, R.S.C 1970, c. P-36.; Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. M-10; Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-9;
Civilian War Pensions and Allowances Act, R.S.C.1970, c. C-20; War Veterans
Allowance Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. W-5; Defence Services Pension Continuation Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. D-3; Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. D-5; R.C.M.P. Pension Continuation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-10;
R.C.M.P. Superannuation Act, R.S.C.1970, c. R-11; Veterans Benefit Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. V-2; Governor General's Retiring Annuity Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
G-15; Judges Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-1, ss. 23-33; Supplementary Retirement
Benefits Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 43(lst Supp.); Pension Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-7;
Teachers Pension Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 301; Public Service Superannuation Act,
R.S.N.S 1967, c. 256; Members' Retiring Allowances Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c.
181; Municipal Corporations Supplementary Powers Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 196,
ss. 16-19; An Act Respecting Pensions for Certain Officers, S.N.S. 1918, c. 22;
Social Assistance Act, S.N.S. 1970, c. 16.
3. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8
4. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63. The standards for registration appear in the Department
of National Revenue's Information Circular 72-13R2, "Employees' Pension
Plans", 19 June, 1974.
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plans for the deduction from "income" of the contributions to, and
the income of, pension funds. The Income Tax Act's requirements
for registration of a "pension plan" are noted throughout the paper.
The prerequisites for registration of a Registered Retirement
Savings Plan and a Deferred Profit Sharing Plan are outlined in
Appendix A.
H. Design and Costing
1. Procedure. Because the uninitiated employer has difficulty
comprehending the infinite variety of pension schemes available he
frequently consults experts at a pension consultant firm for advice.
Thereupon the procedure is: (1) Design the plan. The principal
criterion in the choice of design is the cost to the employer of the
various alternatives. (2) Commission an actuary to cost the package.
(3) If the cost meets the employer's approval, select an underwriter,
appoint an administrative board, and apply for registration under the
Income Tax Act.
2. Types of Pension Benefit. The frequency of the types of
5
benefit in 1970 was:
Type of benefit
money purchase
profit sharing
flat benefit
unit benefit
final earnings
final average earnings
average best earnings
career earnings
total
composite and other
total

% of plans
52.5
1.9
4.6

% of employees
4.9
0.8
15.0
0.1
2.3
6.0
29.5

0.2
6.0
44.7
24.1

37.9
3.1

75.0
4.3

100.0

100.0

Money purchase plans. A money purchase plan defines the
contributions of the employer and the employee; the most common
rate is a contribution of 5% of the employee's pay from both the
employer and the employee. 6 This money is invested, and the
5. Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, supra, note 1 at 17, table D.

6. Id., at 42-43, table 14.
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employee's benefit varies with the assets of the fund at his date of
retirement. A genus of money purchase conceived by the Teachers
Insurance And Annuity Association of America is the equity
annuity plan; the money is invested in an equity portfolio of high
grade common stock, the theory being that the portfolio, and thus
the pension benefit, will appreciate with inevitable inflation.
The small employer, as the above statistics show, prefers the
money purchase plan. This is because his costs are predetermined
and the administration is unsophisticated. The plan finds a cool
reception, however, from many unions and employees. There are
two reasons for this response. First, employees see pensions as a
security, not a sweepstake. They prefer a guaranteed benefit to the
uncertain, though possibly higher, return of a money purchase
pension tied to investment performance. 7 Second, money purchase
discriminates against employees who joined the plan at an advanced
age. Contributions of a 20 year old employee earn income for forty
years more than do the contributions of a 60 year old. If both serve
for five years, the benefit eventually paid to the 20 year old will be
three times the amount of the benefit paid to the 60 year old. 8 This
exacerbates the already volatile intra-union tension between young
and old employees. 9
Profit sharing plan. The employee usually makes no contributions. The employer's contributions are proportionate to the
company's profits (for example "15% of gross profits exempting
20% of capital employed"). An employee accumulates "points"
according to years of service and amount of earnings. Benefits from
the fund are proportionate to the employee's total of "points".
Because his liabilities fall with his company's fortunes, the
employer has no difficulty funding a profit sharing plan. The
employee, however, may be stranded in the worst of both worlds: a
recession threatens both his present employment and his income
after retirement.
FlatBenefit plan. The benefit is fixed in a dollar amount and does
not vary with the financial performance of the fund or the Company,
or with the employee's earnings. Typical formulae are "Benefit of
7. This was the opinion of J.K. Bell, an eminent Nova Scotian trade unionist
shared with Ralph Nader: R. Nader and K. Blackwell, You and Your Pension (New
York: Grossman, 1973) at 61-62, 77.
8. See the tabulation of The Law Society of Upper Canada, Labour Law Part H,
1972, Part D at 6, table 1.
9. For role of the union, see infra, text accompanying footnotes 134 to 139.
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$5 per month for each year that the employee worked over 1800
hours" and "$150 per month commencing at age 65, for employees
with thirty years of service". Only three percent of flat benefit plans
credit the employee with a benefit of over $6 per month for each
year of service. 10 Seventy-five percent of flat benefit plans are
non-contributory1 1 (i.e. the employee does not contribute). The
employer's contribution is uncertain, being the difference between
the employee's contribution (if any) and the monthly benefit
multiplied by the number of months that the employee is expected to
live after retirement. Flat benefit plans are especially popular with
unions because the amount of the benefit is more comprehensible to
the employee than with other designs of plan. The periodic
renegotiation of collective agreements obviates the disadvantage of
flat benefit plans - the decimation of the "real" benefit by
inflation.
Unit benefit plans. Unit benefit plans cover 75% of pensioned
employees. Their distinguishing feature is the variation of the
benefit according to the employee's earnings. The benefit is
calculated as: (i) a specified percentage: the most common is 2% or
1.5%;12 (ii) multiplied by the number of years of service: a
maximum of thirty-five years is common; (iii) multiplied by an
earnings' base, which is, annual earnings of the employee at his
date of retirement ("final earnings"); or average annual earnings of
the employee over, for example, the five years preceding his
retirement ("final average earnings"); or average annual earnings
of the employee over, for example, his five most renumerative years
("average best earnings"); or average annual earnings over his
career ("career earnings"). 1 3
Thus, if an employee is hired at age 35, earns $10,000 annually
until age 55, is promoted to $15,000 from ages 55 to 60, is demoted
to $12,000 from ages 60 to 64, and then raised to $14,000 until his
retirement at age 65: (i) under a 2% final earnings plan he receives
2/100 x 30 x 14,000=$8,400 annual benefit; (ii) under a 2% five
year average best earnings plan he receives 2/100 X 30 x
62,000/5 = $7,440 annual benefit; (iii) under a 2% five year average
best earnings plan he receives 2/100 x 30 x 75,000/5= $9,000
10. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 44-45, table 16.
11. Id.
12. Id., at 42-43, table 15.
13. Section 10 of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B has the effect of a career earnings
plan.
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annual benefit; (iv) under a 2% career earnings plan he receives
2/100 x 30 x 337,000/30= $6,740 annual benefit. Over 25% of
unit benefit plans in 1970 were non-contributory. 14 Of the
remainder the most common rate of contribution from the employee
was 5% of his pay. 15 The employer contributes the uncertain
deficiency of the benefit minus the employee's contribution. 16
Because the final or best earnings of a successful employee are
much greater than his average earnings, he is averse to the
post-retirement reduction of income involved in a career earnings
plan. As the decision-making power over pensions is often vested is
such persons, there was a 1965-70 shift from career earnings to final
and best earnings. 17 Under a final or best earnings plan, however, a
sudden increase in wages (due, for example, to a new collective
agreement) imposes an acute increase in pension liability on the
employer; in the example above the employer's liability under an
average best plan was $2,260 per employee per year greater than
under a career earnings plan. A local pension consultant thus stated
that currently the most popular design in Nova Scotia is a career
earnings plan that the employer may adjust upward at his
convenience.
Summary. The principal difference between the plans is the
variable which determines the amount of the benefit. The benefit
varies: (i) under a money purchase plan, with the performance of the
pension fund's investment portfolio; (ii) under a profit sharing plan,
with the fortunes of the employer's company; (iii) under a flat
benefit plan, there is no distinguishing variable; (iv) under a unit
benefit plan, with the annual earnings of the employee.
3. Eligibility. To avoid needless bookkeeping for transient
employees and the consequent costs of surrender charges from the
underwriter of the fund, plans frequently require a minimum age or
years of service before the employee may "participate" (i.e. before
he may contribute or accumulate pension credits). 18 The age
requirement is frequently the age of majority, to avoid complications with infants' legal status.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 40-41, table 13.
Id.
A costing model is depicted, infra, text accompanying footnotes 91 to 93.
Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 17, table D.
See, for example, s. 3(a)(b) of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
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4. IntergrationWith CanadaPension Plan. Generally, in 1974,
the Canada Pension Plan required both the employee and the
employer to contribute 1.8%, and permitted retired employees to
recover 25%, of the first $6,600 of the employee's pay. This $6,600
(the "Year's Maximum Pensionable Earnings") escalates annually
with the cost of living.1 9 Thus both contributions and benefits rise
with inflation. In practice many "non-integrated" private plans
provide lower dollar rates of contribution and benefit than would be
the case if there was no Canada Pension Plan. An "integrated"
plan, however, states in its formula the reduction of its
contributions and benefits according to the rates in the Canada
Pension Plan. In 1970, 74.6% of pensioned employees were in
integrated plans: 58.1% of private sector employees and 94.7% of
employees under public plans. 20 The frequency of integration
21
methods in 1970 was:

Method of integration
benefit step rate
ineligible earnings
contribution step rate
benefit offset
other
(non-integrated
totals

% of plans
16.2
1.9
10.5
0.7
4.1
66.6
100.0

% of pensioned
employees
62.1
2.0
2.1
2.8
5.6
25.4
100.0

Benefit step rate. Benefits on a fixed maximum portion of the
employee's pay (commonly the C.P.P.'s Year's Maximum
Pensionable Earnings: $6,600 for 1974) are reduced but not
eliminated. The most common range of formulae are benefits of
1.26%-1.49% of the Year's Maximum Pensionable Earnings, and
2% of the employee's pay in excess of the YMPE. 22 Benefit step
rate is feasible only with a plan that specifies the benefit - flat
benefit and unit benefit plans - and not with money purchase and
profit sharing plans which specify only the contributions.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See the Canada Pension Plan, RSC 1970, c. C-5, and amendments.
Statistics Canada, supra, note 1, at 34-35, table 8.
Id.
Id., at 34, table 11.
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Ineligible earnings. The structure is identical to benefit step rate
except that benefits, and usually contributions, are eliminated on the
fixed maximum. The exempt maximum of the employee's pay is
usually lower than with benefit step rate. A familiar career average
plan with ineligible earnings intergration is: "For each year of
service, the employee shall receive 2% of the career average of this
annual earnings over $1,500".
Contribution step rate. With money purchase and profit sharing
plans the contribution, rather than the benefit, is reduced on the
fixed maximum portion of the employee's pay; for example, "The
employer and employee shall contribute 3.2% of the employee's
pay for earnings up to $6,000, and 5% for earnings above $6,000".
Benefit offset. The three previous types of integration fix in
dollars the exempt portion of the employee's pay at, for example,
$6,600. Thus when CPP's Year's Maximum Pensionable Earnings
rises to $6,700 to recompense the employee for the cost of inflation,
the employee's private pension is not reduced for the extra $100; his
total retirement income escalates with the cost of living. The benefit
offset integration raises the exempt portion of the employee's
earnings under the private plan to correspond with the YMPE; a
higher pension under the CPP gives the employee nothing but
lowers the employer's contribution under the private plan. In fact,
because the CPP requires higher contributions to defray higher
benefits, employees in non-contributory private plans lose money
with each annual increase of pensions under the Canada Pension
Plan. The 80,676 Canadians (26,515 of them in Government
plans) 23 who bear these injustices may query the credibility of the
Hon. Marc Lalonde, Minister of National Health and Welfare, who
on November 26, 1973 told the National Pension Conference: "The
simple fact is that CPP benefits will [Lalonde's emphasis] now be
adjusted annually, in line with the total increase in the cost of living.
In other words, whatever the pension is worth when you begin
drawing if it will retain the same purchasing power over the
years."24
Discriminatoryeffect of intergration. Integration operates on the
same premise as a regressive tax: assess the poor at a greater rate
23. Id., at 34, table 8.
24. Quoted in Canadian Labour Congress, CitizenshipMonth; February, 1974; An
adequatePension at Age 60, Jan. 14, 1974, at 7. The Minister was referring to Bill

C-224 which received Royal assent on December 12, 1973, but which did not
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than the rich. Under the 2% career earnings plan with $1,500
ineligible earnings, noted above, the private pension of a man
earning $30,000 annually is reduced by 5%; the pension of a man
earning $3,000 is halved. Those least able to provide for themselves
suffer the most.
Policy of integration. Both pension consultants interviewed
accepted intergration as a matter of course. One stated that: "They
[employers] only have a certain amount of money to give for
pensions. You can't milk a dry cow. Whether the money is
distributed under the Canada Pension Plan or a private pension
shouldn't matter". The Canada Pension Plan need not be a mere
detour for moneys otherwise destined for employees. The American
Securities and Exchange Commission examined the mid-century
growth of private pension funds, and found that "the chief impetus
to pension fund growth, however, was the establishment of the Old
Age and Survivors Insurance in the middle thirties"25 The Hon.
Judy LaMarsh, Minister of National Health and Welfare at the
conception of the Canada Pension Plan, stated in 1964:
[The CPP] is not intended to provide all the retirement income
which most Canadians wish to have. People who now belong to
pension plans - and increasingly, one may expect and hope,
almost all Canadians - will make further provision for their
retirement, beyond the Canada Pension Plan. . .The proper role
of government is to provide a floor. In Canada, as in other
countries, this floor can be expected to help people to be more
pension-minded; it will thus increase,
not diminish, the
26
popularity of private pension plans.
Optimally the CPP should make citizens more "pension-minded".
This has not yet occurred.
5. Past Service Benefits. A man who is sixty years old at the
inception of a pension plan has only five years to accumulate
meagre pension credits. To ensure a higher pension the employer
may contribute for his employee's past service. Because past
service funding is costly the employee's past service credit is
usually lower than his current service credit; for example, a new
plan may provide a 2% career earnings for current and future service
remedy benefit offset integration. See now Canada Pension Plan Ammendment
Act, S.C. 1973-4, c. 41.

25. Securities and Exchange Commission, Survey of Corporate Pension Funds
1951-1954 (Washington: U.S. Government.Printing Office, 1956), at 1.
26. The Hon J. LaMarsh, "The Canada Pension Plan", in L. Coward, ed.,
Pensions in Canada, (Don Mills, Ontario: C.C.H. Canadian Ltd., 1964), at 18.

Pensions: A Primer for Lawyers 377

but only 1%for each year of employment before the inception of the
plan.
The federal Pension Benefits Standards Act requires the employer
to fund his past service liabilities within fifteen to sixty years,
depending on the nature of the liability. 2 7 Section 20(1)(s) of the
Income Tax Act 28 and Information Circular 72-13R2, 29 paras.
11(b), 17-26 state the prerequisites for deduction of past service
contributions: first, the plan must specify the current and future
service benefit, thus excluding past service contributions for money
purchase and profit sharing plans; 301 second, only a limited amount
3
of the contributions are deductible.
Neither Act requires the employer to fund past service; his
discretion is intact. Because of its cost past service funding is rare
and, when implemented, occasionally tragic. In the early 1960's a
prosperous Domco Industries Ltd. had working captial of
$9,700,000. The buoyant company introduced a pension plan and
promised extensive funding for past service. After a spendthrift
management and the mild recession of the 1970's had dissipated the
capital surplus, the Italian syndicate which controlled Domco
sought to "stop the hemorrhage" caused by its unruly past service
liability. Domco wound up the entire pension plan, by then
registered under Quebec's Supplemental Pension Plans Act, 32 and
reduced or ceased payment of pensions to thousands of employees.
After discovering that in several years he would retire without a
pension, one man said: "It was a blow all right. But it was either
can you
that or they would have closed down the plant. What else
33
do but carry on - unless you put a pistol to your head?"
6. Retirement Date. In 1970 76% of pensioned males had a
"normal retirement age" of 65; for 10% the age was 60. For 28% of
women the age was 65; for 53%, 60.3 4 Because Old Age Security
and the Canada Pension Plan become payable at age 65, when the
private plan permits retirement before 65 it occasionally provides a
27. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, s. 11(a); Pension Benefit Standards Regulations,
S.O.R./67-328, s. 10, as am by S.O.R./71-76, schedule.
28. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
29. Dept. of National Revenue, Information Circular 72-13R2, June 19, 1974.
30. Id., at para. 18 (a).
31. Id., at paras. 19(a), 20,21.
32. S.Q. 1965, c. 25.
33. "How Secure is Your Firm's Pension Plan?" The Financial Post, 3 March,
1973, at 8.
34. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 44-45, table 17.
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"bridge benefit". For example, instead of $200 monthly
commencing at age 65, an employee retiring at 60 would receive
from the private plan $250 monthly until age 65 and $175 monthly
afterward.
Early retirement has been described as "probably the most
emotional issue in the pension field today. Young employees are
sure they are going to retire at age 55 or 60.''35 Unions press
diligently for early retirement. 36 For many employees, however, the
capture of early retirement is a Pyrrhic victory. Suppose a 60 year
old employee has ten years of service under a 2% final earnings
plan. His current annual salary is $10,000; his anticipated salary at
age 65 is $15,000. His life expectancy is 75. If he retires at age 60
his annual pension will be 2/100 x 10 x 10,000=$2,000. Before
death he will accumulate $30,000. If he retires at 65 his total
receipts before death will be 2/100 x 15 x 15,000 x 10=$45,000.
Thus early retirement cost the employee $15,000. But few plans
stop here; most submit the employee to an acturial discount for early
retirement. Thus s. 8 of the Dosco plan 3 7 would reduce the
employee's $30,000 by a further 30%. For employers, early
retirement of the workforce can be a lucrative investment.
7. Termination of employment before retirement: Vesting;
Locking-In; Portability:Death and Disability
A consecutive estimate of labour mobility is that, before their
retirement, 76% of 20 year old employees will terminate their
present employment, 5% will die and 4% will become disabled.
38
Only 15% will serve until retirement with their present employer.
What fate awaits the pensions of the wayward 85%?
(i) "Vesting" in the law. Most pensions are either unilateral
contracts or bilateral contracts subject to a condition. The unilateral
consideration or the bilateral condition required of the employee is
service with the employer until retirement or until an earlier
specified date, whereupon the pension "vests". 3 9 Until vesting, the
35. lan H. Ashford, of Imp rial Oil Ltd.; quoted in The Globe and Mail, 1 May,
1973.
36. Canadian Labour Congress, supra, note 24.
37. See Appendix B.
38. Hamilton, The Attorney's Role in Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans: The
Challenge to Learn, Innovate and Advise (1968), 22 Southwestern L.J. 417, lat
422.
39. See, for example, s. 20 of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
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employee probably has no contractual right even to his employer's
past contributions. 4 0 The Income Tax Act requires vesting only for
plans under a provincial or federal Pension Benefits Standards
Act; 4 1 thus most plans in Nova Scotia are exempt. The federal
Pension Benefits Standards Act requires a plan to "contractually
provide" for vesting after ten years of service and attainment of
forty-five years of age. 42 The "forty-five and ten" rule has been the
law in Ontario for almost nine years. 43 Two years ago the Pension
Commission of Ontario recommended a reduction to "forty and
five" 44 Labour, 45 the Globe and Mail 46 and even The Financial
Post 4 7 have clamoured for "full, immediate vesting". Logically,
any of the employer's contributions for a pension should pay for a
pension. Nova Scotia, however, has no statutory requirement of
vesting.
(ii) Vesting in practice. 91.8% of employees not under
legislation are in plans that provide for vesting before retirement.
76.4% are in plans that match or better the statutory requirement of
ten years of service. 48 Thus, it appears superficially that vesting
legislation is unnecessary - employees are well cared for. But
these statistics are misleading because the employee's contributions
are not "locked in". 4 9 A pension is "locked in" when an employee
cannot forfeit the employer's contributions. By a quirk of human
nature the vast majority of employees prefer the "bird in the hand"
of their own contributions in a lump sum to a future pension
composed of employee and employer contributions. The younger
the employee, the more blunted are his sensitivities to pensions; the
more destitute he is, the more he desires liquid capital. If the
employer's contributions are locked in the pension is safe. But the
apparent magnanimity ends here, and it is interesting that
government is the most niggardly of employers. In 1970 2.6% of all
40. The law is discussed in detail infra, text accompanying footnotes 170 to 260.
41. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29, at para. 9(c); W. Mercer, Canadian
Handbook of Pension and Welfare Plans, rev. ed., L. Coward, (4th ed. Don Mills,
Ontario: C.C.H. Canadian Ltd., 1972), at 75.
42. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, ss. 10(l)(a).

43. The Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 342, ss. 21(l)(a), 21(3)(a).
44. The Globe and Mail, 13 October, 1973, at 6 (editorial).
45. E. Finn, The Casefor Co-Management of Employee PensionFunds (1973), 73

The Labour Gazette 356, at 356.
46. Supra, note 35.
47. "More Protection Needed", 14 April, 1973, at 6.
48. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1, at 23, table J.
49. See also s. 20 of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
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employees not under Pension Benefits legislation and .2% of
government employees (who are exempt from Pension Benefits
legislation anyway) were in plans which locked in the employer's
contributions. Only 3.7% of all employees, and .5% of government
employees, were in plans which included the employer's
contributions as part of the lump sum payment. 50 Of the remaining
93.7% of all employees, and 99.3% of government employees, a
local pension consultant estimated that 90% elect to forfeit the
51
employer's contribution on termination of employment.
The repercussions were illustrated in an incident recounted by an
eminent official of Nova Scotia labour, Mr. J. K. Bell. A 58 year
old Nova Scotian needed cash to buy liquor. He could not withdraw
his pension contributions while employed, so he quit his job,
forfeited his pension, received and squandered his cash windfall. He
then developed a heart condition but, as this was pre-Medicare and
he had no job, he could not afford medical attention. J. K. Bell
stated that employees occasionally quit jobs three or four times to
obtain refunds of their contributions, and then live in penury after
retirement.
The Income Tax Act does not require locking-in for plans not
under Pension Benefits legislation. 52 The Pension Benefits
Standards Act forbids commutation of 75% of the pension
benefits. 5 3 Nova Scotia has no locking-in legislation.
(iii) "Pension slavery" and liberation of the employer's
contributions. Plans with long vesting requirements "were designed
to keep the worker with the Company throughout his working
life". 5 4 If he terminates employement he forfeits the employer's
contributions. From his experience in Nova Scotia, one of the
pension consultants interviewed described such workers as
"angry", "hotbeds of dissension"; "they want to leave, but they
are tied to their jobs". An American comentator states: "The older
worker who must forfeit his pension if he chooses to change
employers is uncomfortably close to serfdom" .55
50. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1, at 56-57, table 25. Dalhousie's Staff Scheme,
s. 15 is one of the exceptions that includes the employer's vested contributions in
the lump sum.
51. Section 21 of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B gives the employee a second
chance to "self-destruct" in case he initially elects the pension under s. 20.
52. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29 at para. 9(c).
53. For example, R.S.C. 1970, C. P-8, ss. 10(1)(c,d), 10(2) (a-c).
54. The Globe and Mail, 13 October, 1973, at 6 (editorial).
55. Schulz, PensionAspects of the Economics of Aging: Presentand FutureRoles
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The employer may unilaterally deny the employee his pension by
dismissing the employee before vesting. In Nova Scotia this
practice has prevailed especially in the garment industry. J. K. Bell
cited a poignant example: in 1957 twenty employees at Dominion
Steel and Coal Co.'s coaling station at Pier 9 in Halifax were
nearing their vesting dates. To avoid pension liabilities Dosco
closed the station and all the employees lost their jobs. Most of the
workers were over sixty years of age, but as none had met the
vesting requirements 56 they also ceded their pensions. The Trade
Union Act, 5 7 s. 51(3)(d) protects unionized employees on strike or
discharged contrary to the Act. There is no other statutory safeguard
of pension rights on dismissal before vesting. The notice period for
dismissal without cause at common law and under the Labour
Standards Code, 58 s. 68, merely antedates the employee's notice of
discharge.
(iv) Disposition of the money - a synopsis. To recap, of Nova
Scotian employees not under the federal Pension Benefits Standards
Act, who terminate employment other than by retirement, death or
disability: (i) roughly 8.2% will lose thier pensions because their
plan has no vesting provision; (ii) of the 91.8% of employees in
plans with vesting, anyone who terminates before vesting will lose
his pension; of those who terminate after vesting, roughly 85% will
voluntarily forfeit their pensions. The latest available statistics
(1965) 59 show that only 3% of terminated employees under pension
plans will receive pensions.
Employees who lose their pensions usually receive "the return of
their contributions plus interest.''60 A local pension consultant
stated that interest in Nova Scotia plans is usually about 3% and
rarely above 4%. The Dosco Plan offered 2-1/2% compounded. 61
Because pensions are underwritten by a variety of carriers trustees, insurance companies, governments - there is no data
measuring investment returns of all pension funds. But J. K. Bell
said that a pension manager could "walk downstairs to a
co-operative insurance company and receive 7% on a NHA
of Private Pensions (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), at 39.
56. See ss. 19-20 of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
57. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19.
58. S.N.S. 1972, c. 10.
59. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1, at 22. The 1970 data concerns only the
provisions in plans, not the disposition of the money on termination.
60. See, for example, s. 19 of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
61. Appendix B. ss. 19, 2(s). The Dalhousie Plan, s. 15 allows 3-1/2%.
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mortgage, probably 9% on a conventional mortgage". Because
pensions are long term, interest is crucial. If an employee severed
after twenty years of participation receives interest 5% lower than
the annual rate of return of the pension fund, he reaps 100% less
than he has sown.
The settlor of a trust cannot withdraw the money at will. 6 2 Thus
when (i) the employer's contributions are forfeited or (ii) the
employee receives less than a fair interest rate, the money must stay
in the fund. Under flat and unit benefit plans, however, the
employer need only pay the difference between the specified
amount of benefit and the assets of the fund. When the fund is
enriched by money denied to an employee, the employer discounts
his future contributions. The trust money might as well be in his
pocket.
(v) Portability, A "portable" plan is one where the employer's
contributions are not only vested, but may be transferred to the
pension fund of the pensioner's new employer. The Pension
Benefits Standards Act does not demand portability. The Income
Tax Act permits 63 but does not require portability. The Superintendent of the Dalhousie fund stated that portability between most
University plans is only rarely effected because of the actuarial
inconvenience of transposing the figures of, for example, a career
earnings plan at University of Toronto to the final average plan at
Dalhousie. A local pension consultant acknowledged the problem of
asymmetry but indicated that it may not be insoluble. The leading
64
Canadian authority states:
This procedure is portability in a literal sense and to carry it out
the various pension plans involved do not need to be similar. The
actuaries of the first employer calculate the reserve held in the
fund in respect of the employee, and all or part of this
reserve.

. . is

paid directly to the pension fund of the second

employer. The actuaries of the second employer calculate the
amount of pension or the number of years of credited service
which may be reasonably granted the new employee in respect of
the transferred funds. Usually the details of the calculation
method are contained in a reciprocal transfer agreement between
the funds involved in the transaction.
62. Regulations under the Pension Benefits Standards Act, SOR/67-328, s. 9(4)
reinforces the common law by forbidding withdrawals from pension funds except
under stated circumstances.
63. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, ss. 60(j-l), 146(16).
64. Mercer, supra, note 41 at 43.
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More ambitious is industry-wide portability within a geographical
unit. It utilizes the "hour bank" system and is especially
appropriate for industies with high labour mobility. Through
collective bargaining each employer under the plan is assessed, for
example, $.20 per hour of work per employee. Employers pay the
money into a central trust, and the employee is credited with a
benefit commensurate to the contributions made on his behalf. 65
The pension consultants interviewed knew of no Nova Scotian
instance of industry-wide portability. Thirdly, the employer may
dispose of his pension responsibilities by paying the money credited
to the employee into a Registered Retirement Savings Plan. The
employee then controls his own pension subject to the Income Tax
Act. 66 The advantages of portability to the employee are obvious.

The employer also has something to gain; for example, he
need not keep records for employees who may have been dead
for a decade.
(vi) Termination by death or disability. Without special
provision in the plan the employer's contractual duties respecting
employees severed before vesting by death or disability are identical
to this duties to other terminated employees; as the condition
precedent to the employer's duty is unfulfilled, he need not pay a
pension. Because contributory plans in practice always return the
employee's contributions, his quasi-contractual right to recover
these moneys is untested. The issue, therefore, is the extent to
which the employee or his survivor recovers money other than the
employee's contributions.
Death. The Pension Benefits Standards Act enforces but does not
require a death benefit in a pension plan. 6 7 The Income Tax Act

permits but does not require (a) a refund of contributions with or
without interest 6 8 (b) an appended life insurance policy6 9 and (c) a
survivor's pension paying a maximum of a "reasonable and
moderate" benefit. 70 When a death benefit "is payable under the
plan" the Beneficiaries Designation Act 1 subrogates for
65. Id., at 179-85.
66. Registered Retirement Savings Plans are discussed, infra, Appendix A.
67. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, ss. 10(1)(c), 13.
68. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29 at para. 9(c).
69. Id., at para. 36.
70. Id., at para. 9(f).
71. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 21 s. 2; adopted by the Pension Benefits Standards Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8. s. 13.
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beneficiary to the rights of the employee. In 1970, the provision for
72
death benefits in private plans was:
type of benefit
no death benefit 73
refund of employee
contributions only 74
refund of employee contributions (if any) and vested
employer contributions 75
survivor's pension
other

% of plans % of employees
22.5
5.4

total

100.

25.1

35.8

66.5
2.6
0.4

15.6
23.5
2.6
100.

The survivors of 58.3% of employees will receive none of the
employer's past contributions; if the plan is non-contributory they
will receive nothing. Their fate is illustrated by letters written to
Ralph Nader: 76 "My husband died in 1970 while still working for
the same company he had worked for for thirty-one years. The
company said I would not get a nickel of his pension because my
name was not on a certain paper. "...."I was one of those
unfortunate widows who could not collect on my husband's pension
plan. My husband was within two months of collecting his first
pension check when he passed away." If the employer wants to pay
the survivor something beyond the employee's contributions in a
lump sum he should do it by way of group life insurance rather than
a pension plan. Death benefits via a pension plan are taxable in the
77
hands of the estate; through life insurance they are not taxable.
Widow's pensions are invariably actuarially discounted, usually
by 50%.78 Thus an employee with ten years of service under a
career earnings plan is entitled to 20% of his average earnings; if he
72. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 56-57, table 26.
73. These were all non-contributory plans, Id., at 24.
74. See, for example, the Dosco Plan, s. 15, in Appendix B. Interest is again
2'/2%: s. 2(s).
75. See, for example, the Dalhousie Plan, s. 16.
76. Nader, supra, note 7 at 97.
77. Mercer, supra, note 41 at 50. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, ss.
148(l)(a), 148(9)(c)(i); also ss. 6(l)(a), 6(4), 56(l)(a)(iii).
78. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 58-59, table 28.
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dies his widow would receive 10% of his average earnings, annually
until her death. The Department of National Revenue's model of a
"reasonable and moderate" survivor's pension has a discount of
60%, further reduced if the spouse is more than ten years younger
than the deceased employee. 79 To avoid abuse of the survivorship
provisions "by deathbed nuptials in favour of a third party," the
plan usually requires that the widow has been married for a certain
number of years before the employee's death. Remarriage of the
widow is generally a condition subsequent.
Disability. The Pension Benefits Standards Act does not
specifically refer to disability benefits. Thus the money is locked-in
and must be taken as an annuity.8 0 Pension benefits are taxable in
the hands of the employee. 8 ' In 1972 Long Term Disability
Insurance benefits also became taxable, 82 rendering pension plans a
proper forum for disability annuities. The Department of National
Revenue permits but does not require disability benefits in a
Registered Pension Plan; the maximum alowable benefit is a
"reasonable" amount. 83 The range of disability benefits in the
84
private sector in 1970 was:

type of benefit
full pension accrued
at date of disability
actuarially reduced
pension
flat amount per month
other
no disability benefit
total

% of plans

% of employees
covered

4.2

27.7

19.1
.7
2.2
73.8

16.3
.5
11.6
43.9

100.

100.

The Dalhousie Plan is ingenious. Section 14 permits the disabled
employee to continue his pension contributions while receiving
79. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29 at para. 9(f).
80. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, ss. 10(l)(c,d), 10(2)(a-c).
81. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 56(l)(a). See also, s. 60(a), (j),

(m-n).
82. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 6(l)(f).
83. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29 at para. 9(d).
84. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 49, table 20.
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Long Term Disability benefits. On retirement, the Disability benefit
ceases and the pension begins.
8. Manner of Payment of the Benefits. The Pension Benefits
Standards Act does not permit a lump sum payment on retirement.8 5
With stated exceptions a plan registered under the Income Tax Act
must be an "annuity payable at least for life". 8 6 Life annuities vary:
(i) A "straight life annuity" ends with the death of the employee.
(ii) A "life annuity with a guaranteed period" (of, for example, five
years) pays the beneficiary for three years afters the employee's
death if the employee dies two years after retirement. Because of the
underwriter's added liability, each instalment paid to the pensioner
is lower than with a straight life annuity. (iii) A "joint and
survivorship annuity" pays a benefit for the lives of the employee,
his wife and the survivor of them. Because the underwriter insures
two lives this form pays the lowest instalment of all. (iv) Finally, an
annuity might be paid for a period guaranteeing the return of the
employee's contributions. Common practice is the "optioned"
pension of the Dalhousie Plan, s. 9 and the Dosco Plan, s. 14. Three
months before retirement, a participant in the Dalhousie scheme is
notified that he may elect a straight life annuity, a guaranteed ten
year annuity with a lower monthly pension or a joint and
survivorship annuity with a still lower benefit. The employee
gauges his life expectancy and that of his joint annuitant, then
tempts fortune with a selection.
9. Post-RetirementAdjustment ForInflation
In 1970 only .4% of plans covering 6.8% of employees in
pension plans had escalator clauses tying the benefit to the
Consumer Price Index.8 7 Parliament recently removed the 2%
annual ceiling on escalations under the Canada Pension Plan;8 8
whether this will cause private pension managers to be more
"pension-minded" remains to be seen. A second method of
dodging inflation is to purchase "variable annuities", which are
post-retirement extensions of the "equity annuity" principle
discussed above. 8 9 The annuity varies with the performance of a
portfolio of common stock, in the faith that the stock market rises
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, ss. 10(1)(c,d), 10(2)(b-d).
Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29 at para. 9(b).
Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 25.
Canada Pension Plan Ammendment Act, S.C. 1973-4, c. 41.
Supra, text following note 6.
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with inflation. Variable annuities are also rare, covering 2.5% of
employees in pension plans in 1970.90
10. Costing The Package Suppose a 2% career earnings plan
requires the employee to contribute 5% of his salary, 9 1 has
integration of $2,000 in eligible earnings, a death benefit of return
of the employee's contributions, and a retirement age of 65. Vesting
is at 50 years of age plus ten years of participation. A 40 year old
employee with fifteen years of participation will earn $8,000 in
1974. How much should the employer contribute to meet his
liabilities to the employee for March, 1974? (1) Estimate the
employee's salary for the next 25 years, and take his average annual
salary for his career. Assume that the actuaries decide that his
average career salary will be $12,000. (2) $12,000 minus $2,000
ineligible earnings leaves $10,000 pensionable earnings. (3) 2% of
$10,000 equals $200 pension credit earned by the employee each
year, for each year of retirement. (4) Assume that the mortality
tables show that a 40 year old male will live to 75. The employee
has earned 10 (years) X $200=$2,000 total pension credit. (5)
Assume that the labour mobility tables show that there is a 40%
chance that the employee will terminate his employment before
vesting. Thus the employer may reduce his contributions by 40%,92
60% of $2,000=$1,200. (6) The employee's pensionable earnings
in 1974 are $8,000 minus $2,000 ineligible earnings leaving
$6,000, of which he contributes 5% or $300 in 1974. (7) If the
interest tables show that a 5% average annual interest rate will
prevail over the next thirty-five years the employee's $300, without
compounding for this simple model, will become 275/100 X $300=
$825 when he attains the age of seventy-five. (8) Thus $375 must
enter the fund before the employee dies. (9) At 5% annual simple
interest the employer's contributions will earn 175% before the
employee dies. 100/275 X $375= $136.36 required for 1974, or
$11.36 for March, 1974 for a straight life annuity. (10) A five year
guarantee appreciates the employer's costs by 2.2%, a ten year
guarantee by 8.2%, and a full and joint survivorship annuity by
45.2%. 93
90. Statistics Canada,supra, note 1 at 25-26.
91. 5% is the most common rate of employee contribution. Id., at 36-37, table 9.
92. Alternatively, the employer may contribute the full $2,000.00 and discount his
future contributions after the employee terminates. See supra, text following note
62.
93. Law Society of Upper Canada, supra, note 8, Part D at 15, table 5.
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III. Administration of the Plan
1. Funding Versus No Funding
A "funded" plan has assets covering all pension credits already
accumulated by retired and active employees; if the plan is wound
up every employee would receive from the fund every dollar to
which he has become entitled. An "unfunded" plan maintains the
employer's liability but delays his payment into the fund of money
credited to employees. There are two forms of "unfunded" plans:
(i) Terminalfunding: The employer discharges his total liability at
the date of retirement. If the pension is $100 monthly the employer,
on the employee's retirement, will purchase an annuity from an
insurance company for about $15,000. (ii) Pay as you go: The
pension is paid directly from the employer's working capital. There
is no fund, no carrier, not security for the employee. The Pension
Benefits Standards Act 94 requires advance funding. The Income
Tax Act 95 does not.
Insolvency of the employer can shatter an unfunded plan. As the
insurance company or trustee has not received money sufficient to
pay the pension, the employee is left to his contractual remedy
against the insolvent or bankrupt employer. Unless pensions are
"pay" under the Labour Standards Code, 9 6 ss. l(n), 77(6) and 84,
the employee is an unsecured contractual creditor. When Nova
Scotia acquired the Sydney Works of Dominion Steel and Coal
Corporation in 1967-68 the Dosco Plan, according to J. K. Bell,
was underfunded by thousand of dollars. Only the Government's
resuscitation of the plan with lump-sum contributions avoided
widespread default of pension payments. Funding also has
advantages for the employer: his costs do not fluctuate with flurries
of retirement in the work force.
Peculiar to Government plans is "notional funding" with "fairy
money". The accounts of the pension fund are credited with the
amounts needed to pay the pensions of retired employees, but the
Government pays no dollars into the pension fund. Pensions are
paid directly from the Consolidated Fund. 97 Notional funding
94. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, s. 11(a); SOR67-328, s. 10, as am by SOR/71-76,

Schedule.
95. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 20(1)(r); Circular 72-13R2,
supra, note 29 at paras. 1 (a), (c), 17(c).

-

..

96. S.N.S. 1972, c. 10. As to a pension's status as "wages",
accompanying footnotes 206 to 213.

see infra, text

97. See, for example, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act,
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allows the Government to trace its liability while postponing the day
of reckoning. As Government solvency is secure the practice should
raise no problems. But problems do arise because in dealings with
governments actuaries may carelessly suspend disbelief. The U.K.
Teachers' Superannuation Fund was established by statute in 1925.
Current and future service credits were to be financed by 5%
contributions from both teachers and local school boards. The
Government promised to fund past service credits. Government
contributions were notionally marked up. The Exchequer accountants believed what they saw on the Superannuation Fund's account
books, assumed the money was paid, and ignored the Superannuation Fund in twenty-three consecutive annual budgets. The 1948
valuation of the Fund stumbled upon a $102 million deficit. As the
Government had no such money, Parliament raised the contribution
rates of teachers and school boards to meet the deficiency. As of
1962 the Government had not paid a shilling toward the past service
that it promised to fund in 1925.98
2. Methods of Funding As money purchase and profit sharing
plans define the employer's contribution, their funding raises no
difficulty. Funding problems arise, however, with flat benefit and
unit benefit plans where the employer's contributions are uncertain.
There two methods of funding such plans: 99 (i) "Single premium"
or "accrued benefit": Each month the employer pays the amount of
benefit accruing to the employee in that month. In the costing model
discussed above he contributes $11.36 for this month. (ii) "Level
premium" or "projected benefit": The employer pays a fixed
number of dollars per employee per month. In the costing model the
employer might pay $35 per month for a straight life annuity, each
month of the employee's participation. The amount does not rise
with the increase earnings of the employee. Eventually the
employer will pay identical sums of money; but in the short run the
funding method chosen is a crucial determinant of the liquidity
demanded by the pension plan.
A 60-year old man will more likely serve until vesting age than
will a 30-year old. Contributions for the average 60-year old will
R.S.C. 1970, c. R-1 1. By s. 24 Government contributions are "charged" against
the Consolidated Fund and "credited" to the Superannuation Account. By s. 23,
payments are made from the Consolidated Fund and "charged" to the
Superannuation Account.
98. G. Rhodes, Public Sector Pensions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1965), at 107-115.

99. Mercer, supra, note 41, at 56-62.
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earn income for a shorter period than will contributions for a
30-year old. Thus it has been estimated that, to provide indentical
monthly pensions, the employer must contribute sixteen times as
much money for a 60-year old than for a 30-year old. 100 The
average age of a company's pensioned work force always rises in
the generation after the institution of the plan, while the initial
employees reach retirement age. Thus an employer of a new plan,
and an employer of an aging workforce, who uses single premium
funding may be stung by a swift rise in pension costs. To avoid
sudden demands for liquid capital these employers should use
level-premium funding, overfunding yound employees but underfunding older employees at the "level" rate. For an employer of a
work force with a constant average age there is no need to overfund
young employees; single premium is better.
3. Choice of the Carrieror Underwriter
The Pension Benefits Standards Act Regulations 10 1 and the
Department of National Revenue' 0 2 require that a pension plan be
administered by a life insurance company, a corporate or individual
trustee, a pension fund society 10 3 or the Government of Canada.
10 4
The methods of administration are:

Funding instrument
life insurance company
- individual annuities
- group annuities
- deposit administration
- segregated funds
trusteed
- individual trustee
- corporate trustee
- pension fund society
Canadian Government Annuities
Government Consolidated Funds
Other
Total

% of
plans
68.6

% of
employees
covered
14.1

27.2

60.4

1.6
0.1
2.5
100

0.1
21.6
3.8
100

100. A. Pedoe, Life Insurance, Annuities and Pensions, (2nd ed. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1970), at 361.
101. SOR/67-328, s. 9(1).
102. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29, at para. 6(e).
103. The officers of a corporation may establish a corporate pension fund society,
which will administer the pension fund, under the Pension Fund Societies Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. (-9.
104. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1 at 14, chart 4.
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(i) Life Insurance Annuities: There are two types of annuities.
With an "individual annuity" the employer purchases a separate
annuity for each employee. The contract is held in trust for the
employee until his retirement. A "group annuity" is a master
contract covering all employees in the plan. Individual annuities
have the advantage that, after termination of employment, the
employee may adopt the contract and continue contributions. Most
insured plans are group annuities, however, because their
economies of scale substantially reduce the employer's premium.
Because under an annuity contract the insurance company
guarantees the amount of the pension, the success of the fund's
investment is of no concern to the employee or employer. Of
course, to compensate for the insurance company's risk premiums
are higher than the contributions needed to fund a trusteed plan.
Annuities may have cash surrender value; thus the employer may
change the plan's underwriter, after paying a surrender charge.
Annuities have the disadvantage of being inflexible; the pension
plan must fit into the insurance company's mold. Thus benefits on
death, disability and early retirement may not be fundable through
annuities. 105
Deposit administration: Contributions are paid into a separate
fund managed by the insurance company. The insurance company
usually guarantees the capital of the fund and minimal interest, but
not the amount of the pension; if the employer's contributions are
insufficient to pay the pension the insurance company is not
responsible. With annuities, after payment of each premium the
insurance company, in its books, credits each employee with a
portion of deferred annuity. With deposit administration, no money
is allocated until an employee retires. Then the insurance company
pays from the fund the amount directed by the employer and
purchases an immediate annuity. Deposit administration is less
formalized than an annuity contract and can fund all aspects of
10 6
pension plans.
Segregated funds: The Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act restricts an insurance company's power to invest its
assets in equities,' 0 7 but permits the company to "segregate" from
105. Mercer, supra, note 41 at 69-70.
106. Id., at 70-71 D. Baum, The Investment Function of Canadian Financial
Institutions (New York: Praeger, 1973) at 156-57.
107. The investment guidelines are stated in Canadian and British Insurance
Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-15, ss. 63-68.
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its general assets a fund which may be totally invested in
equities. ' 0 8 This is a "segregated fund". An employer of a pension
plan managed by segregated funding directs what proportions of the
fund will be allocated to the "bond fund", the "equities fund", the
"mortgage fund", etc. The insurance company then selects the
individual investments in each portfolio. In 1971 the assets of
segregated funds were invested 51.5% in stocks, 25.4% in bonds,
18% in mortgages, and most of the remainder in short-term
securities.' 0 9 Segregated funds give the employer intimate control
over investment policy. In return, the insurance company will
invariably exact an exemption from liability for any diminution in
the fund. Thus the "insurance" company manages the money but
"insures" nothing. On the employee's retirement money proportionate in amount to his pension credit is paid from whatever is left
of the segregated fund to purchase an annuity.
(ii) Trusteed The employer enters into a declaration of trust,
and contributions are held by the trustees in either a "separate" or a
"pooled" fund. A pooled fund is an accumulation of the moneys of
small funds, and offers economies of scale in the management of
investments for small pension plans. 1 10 The employer distributes
the money among the corporate trustee's pooled stock fund, pooled
Government bond fund, pooled corporate bond fund, pooled NHA
mortgage fund, pooled conventional mortgage fund, and pooled
U.S. equity fund. Individual investments are made by the trustee. A
separate trust fund is subject to whatever terms the employer
chooses to insert in the indenture of an individual trust or whatever
"adhesive" exemption clauses the corporate trustee inevitably
requires in its standard form trust indenture.
Trusteed carriage of a pension plan has the advantage of
flexibility: stipulations in the indenture may give the employer
fingertip control over investment, and the power to modify or
terminate the pension plan at will. Benefits on death, disability or
early retirement - matters sometimes too eccentric for insurance
companies are easily administered under a trust. The
disadvantage of trusteed funds is that there is no guarantee. Unless

108. Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-15, ss. 48,
63, 81.
109. Statistics Canada, Trusteed Pension Plans: Financial Statistics, 1971
(Catalogue 74-201 (Annual). Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at Appendix D.
110. Most pooled pension funds cover plans with under fifty employees. Id., 26.
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the trustee's misconduct is so gross as to be a breach of trust he is
not responsible for diminution of the fund.
On the employee's retirement, the pension is paid either directly
from the trust fund or from an annuity purchased by the trustee.
(iii) Canadian Government Annuities The Government Annuities Act 11 1 states that, pursuant to a contract between an
employer and an employee, Her Majesty may sell an annuity for the
life of the employee. Government Annuities guarantee the amount
of the pension, but the maximum annuity is $100 per month. The
history of Government Annuities typifies a government financing
public welfare by floundering in private enterprise. In 1908
Parliament passed the Government Annuities Act, as the embryo of
old age securily. Unfortunately, the Government computed its
premiums using mortality tables three decades outdated in 1908.
The curiously high expense of its annuities led the Government to
modify its tables - in 1930. With modem tables, Government
Annuities ceased to be competitive with the more efficiently
managed annuities of insurance companies. In 1962, the Royal
Commission on Government Organization noted that "the programme has been very costly to the Government" 1 12 and stated:
"Apart from a periodic attractiveness when premiums are allowed
to get out of line, some inflexible aspects of government annuity
contracts make them less popular than competing forms. It is not
unfair to suggest that the only circumstances in which they will be
sold in volume is when they are priced below the current market;
thus the cost of making good future deficiencies will be substantial
indeed." 11 3 Acting on the Royal Commission's recommendation
the Government administratively decided in 1967 to cease the sale
of new annuities. Existing annuities continue to be paid.
(iv) Consolidated Revenue Funds Public pensions in many
114
forms are paid out of public funds.
IV.

Distributionof Power in the Administration of the Plan

The initiation of a pension not in a collective agreement is the
voluntary act of a generous employer. After its initiation, noblesse
oblige should cease and legal liability should begin. There are three
111. R.S.C. 1970, c. G-6, s. 6(3).
112. Glassco Committee - Report of the Royal Commission on Government
Organization (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1962), vol. 3 at 288.
113. Id., at 287-88.
114. See supra, note 2.
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reasons: (1) The employer's motives are not totally immaculate;
pensions offer him concrete advantages. A pension attracts good
workers. Pre-vesting forfeiture on termination holds the good
workers. A post-retirement income morally justifies compulsory
retirement of unproductive older workers. Finally, the employer's
contributions are deductible under the Income Tax Act. 115 (2)
Under contributory plans the employer controls the employee's
contribution for as long as forty-five years. (3) Most important, the
employee relies on the belief that he will receive a pension. Denial
of a pension to an elderly employee causes irreparable damage
because he is too old to begin to save enough money for his
retirement, and too unproductive competitively to offer his services
on the labour market. He retires into poverty. Nonetheless, a
pension not in a collective agreement is a contract of adhesion. The
alternative to the employer's dictates is no pension. This part
examines the disproportion between the employee's stake in a
pension and his control over the pension in practice and in law.
1. The Administrative Board The Department of National
Revenue requires that a plan have an "administrator" and permits
the administrator to be the employer, the employer's delegate, or
the trustee serving in a dual capacity. 116 J. K. Bell stated that, save
for rare instances under collective agreements, the administrators of
plans in Nova Scotia are invariably minions of the company. 1 7 The
Administrator or the administrative board cannot contravene the
terms of the pension plan. The problem is that under the plan he
may approach omnipotence. Powers commonly given to administrators by pension plans are: to decide if the employee is eligible to
participate in the plan;"1 8 to decide whether a cessation of
employment is a "termination" requiring a forfeiture of pension
credits; 1 9 to define the employee's pensionable pay;1 20 to accept
evidence and determine whether an employee is entitled to a
pension on the basis of age, disability or early retirement;' 2 1 to
115. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 20(1)(q), (s); see ss. 18(1)(j), 2 0(l)(y), 60(k), and
147 (8-9) for deferred profit sharing plans.
116. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29 at para. 6(g).
117. See, for example, the Dosco Plan's triumvirate in ss. 22-23, and also s. 29, in
Appendix B.
118. See the Dosco Plan, s. 24(b), in Appendix B.
119. Mercer, supra, note 41 at 53.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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compute the amount of benefits payable under the plan; 122 to
compute rates of interest;12 3 to authorize all payments by the
trustee; 124 to redirect the pension to a third party; 125 to end the
pension for acts prohibited by the plan; 126 to instruct regional
committees in the operation of the plan; 127 to make rules for the
administration of the plan; 128 to construe the plan finally and
conclusively; 129 without limitation by the foregoing, all powers
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the plan. 1 30 The
administrators may then be exempted from personal liability' 3 ' and
need not be bonded. 132 The terms of any accompanying trust
indenture will complement the terms of the pension plan. One local
pension consultant stated that in Nova Scotia almighty administrators are the rule rather than the exception.
Custody and legal title to the fund are in the trustees; so the
employee's pension should be physically and legally beyond the
grasp of the employer's administrators. The Dalhousie fund belies
this assumption. Section 17 of the Dalhousie Plan empowers the
Investment Committee of the Board of Governors' 33 to specify the
investments to be made by the trustee of the pension fund. Until
recently the Investment Committee had delegated this discretion to
the trustee. The Board of Governors grew dissatisfied with the low
return on the trustees' investments - notably Cape Breton bonds
returning 21/2% annually - so it terminated the trust, drafted a new
deed and appointed new trustees. The new trustees are members of
the Board of Governors' Investment Committee.
Administrators are appointed and instructed by the employer but
they manage the employees' contributions and pensions. They have
absolute power but may be swathed in exemption clauses. Most
administrators are conscientious but the opportunity for defalcation
is inescapable. The inverse proposition illustrates the iniquity:
122. See s. 24(c) of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
123. Id., at s. 25.
124. Id., at ss. 23, 24(4), 35.

125. Id., at s. 27.
126. Id., at s. 32.
127. Id., at s. 30.

128. Id., at ss. 24, 30.
129. Id., at s. 24(2).
130. Id., at s. 24.
131. Id., at s. 26-28.
132. Id., at s. 28.
133. Except for one representative from each of the Senate and Faculty, the
members of the Pension Committee are appointed by the University.
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would it not be absurd if an executive pension plan was
administered exclusively by a trade union?
2. Assertion of Power by Trade Unions Approximately 500 of
the 20,000 private pension plans in Canada are subject to collective
bargaining. 13 4 To what extent do the 500 plans safeguard the
interests of employees?
There are Americans of union graft in the administration of
Pension Funds. One of the most bizarre involves the $21,000,000
pension fund of the Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers, Cosmetologists and Proprietors' International Union. One day in 1966 a
total stranger named Shaheen walked into the office of the Pension
Committee. According to the Union's secretary-treasurer, Shaheen
"criticized the bank's investment decisions. He was trying to say
they had made only so much money, that he could have made more.
13 5
He convinced the Board the bank was losing the fund money."
Instead of investigating Shaheen's credentials - and discovering
that Shaheen had filed for bankruptcy in Chicago - the Union
promptly appointed him as the fund's Supervising Pension
Consultant. By 1971 Shaheen had supervised the fund into
receivership, had absconded and had been indicted on various
counts for mismanagement of the pension moneys; he has yet to be
tried. Also indicted for taking illegal fees and kick-backs was the
36
Union President, appropriately named Joseph de Paola. 1
Graft is, of course, absent from pristine Nova Scotia. In fact, the
Canadian problem is at the other extreme. "The main reason for the
inadequacies in pension coverage in Canada can be traced to the
failure or reluctance of the unions, up to now, to make pension
improvements a priority bargaining issue." 1 3 7 Three reasons have
been cited for union timidity.1 3 8 First, union negotiators are
overawed by the costing complexities of pensions and often accept
the estimates of the employer's actuaries. Second, union leaders
shun the burdensome responsibilities of co-administration of
pension plans. Third, unions are politically motivated to neglect
pensions: retirees are no longer in the union's voting constituency
134. E. Finn, The Case for Co-Managementof Employee Pension Funds (1973),
73 The Labour Gazette 356, at 356.
135. Quoted in Nader, supra, note 7, at 66.
136. Id., at 66-68. See also the fate of the Teamsters' fund and the exploits of
Tony Boyle with the United Mine Workers' fund. Id., at 68-7 1.
137. Finn, supra, note 134, at 362.
138. Id., at 358.
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but younger workers are; and young workers often see pensions as
trivialities, decades distant. 139 The results of union indifference
were stated by J. K. Bell: unions relinquish their pension demands
at the bargaining table, or incorporate by reference the pre-existing
individual plan with all its hedging clauses unaltered; when a Nova
Scotia union does realize a plan in a collective agreement it is
frequently a "me too" plan adopted verbatim from an Ontario
settlement and not negotiated with reference to the needs of Nova
Scotians.
The procedure for the negotiation of a newly-designed plan in
Nova Scotia is usually to decide the amount of the benefit at the
bargaining table to defer the negotiation of details to actuaries
representing the employer and the union.
3. Investments The Department of National Revenue requires that
a pension plan have a term stating that investments shall be in
accordance with the Pension Benefits Standards Act. 140 The
Pension Benefits Standards Act states that not over 10% of the fund
may be invested in a single undertaking, 14 1 and generally limits
investments qualitiatively to: bonds and debentures, shares of
financially stable companies, and real estate up to three quarters of
the value of a parcel of land; certain real estate must be used for
income and not capital gain.1 42 The Act also prohibits self-serving
loans to a relative or employee of the employer, the administrator or
the union, but there is no prohibition on investments in the
employer's company. 143 The Canadian and British Insurance
Companies Act' 44 places general restrictions on the investment
powers of insurance companies. The Trustee Act 145 regulates the
investments of trustees, but ss. 2, 5-9 ensure that the statute
operates only in the absence of contrary intent in the trust indenture.
Neither statute prohibits self-serving investment of pension funds.
One local pension consultant stated that, especially for funds
administered by trustees, the pension plan and the trust indenture
139. See, for example, the discussion of "locking-in", supra, accompanying
footnotes 49 to 53. According to the Superintendent of the Dalhousie fund,
disaffection of young employees is a serious problem with the University Plan.
140. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29, at paras. 13, 25(b).
141. SOR/67-328, s. 8, Schedule C, s. 8.
142. See generally R.S.C., 1970, c. P-8, s. 11(b); SOR/67-328, s. 8, Schedule C.
143. SOR/67-328, s. 8; Schedule C, s. 11.
144. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-15, ss. 63-68. For segregated funds see ss. 48, 63, 81, and
139;as am R.S.C. 1970, c. 19 (1st Supp.), ss. 14, 19, 25, 46.
145. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 317, ss. 2-15, 74. See also the Trust Companies Act,
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 316, ss. 59-61.
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commonly give the employer the power to direct investments.
Section 17 of the Dalhousie Plan states: "The Pension Fund shall be
invested in accordance with the direction of the Investment
Committee of the Board of Governors. .." 146
The danger of concentration of investment power in the employer
is that an investment opportune for the employer may not profit the
employee. The Sears, Roebuck pension fund owns 24% of the
Company's stock. 14 7 After the high price of Sears shares inhibited
further purchases the pension fund bought substantial interests in six
Sears subsidiaries. 148 With 80% of the pension fund's assets
invested in Sears, 14 9 misfortune for the Company could pauperize
thousands of pension recipeients. Moreover, there is conflict of
interest. Under the Sears pension plan and trust indenture, the
Company's Board of Directors dictates the investments to be made
by the trustees. As the major voting shareholders of Sears,
Roebuck, 15 0 the trustees in turn designate the composition of the
Board of Directors. At the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee Hearings on
the Stock Market, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Pension Plan (who was also Chairman of Sears, Roebuck's Finance
Committee) testified: "In thrity years during which I have been
connected with the company, and twenty-six years during which I
have headed the company, we [the trustees] have never had a
dispute. We have never had any controversy, and we have never
had any proxy fight. It has been very peaceful. There is, of course,
the danger at some time the trustees might seek to perpetuate a man
for their own selfish purposes." 5 1
Abuses are not absent from Nova Scotia. Eastern Provincial
Airlines, for example, has used its pension funds to purchase
aircraft. 152 J.K. Bell complained that many abuses are not detected
because pension funds classify their investment records. In 1971 the
securities traded by trusted pension funds in the industrial sector
suffered a new loss of over $28,000,000,153 which suffices "to
146. See the discussion of the Dalhousie Plan, supra, and note 133.
147. F. Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-rich (New York: Bantam Books Inc.,

1968), at 272.
148. P. Harbrecht, Pension Funds and Economic Power (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1959), at 87.
149. Nader, supra, note 7, at 72.
150. Lundberg, supra, note 147, at 272.
151. Harbrecht, supra, note 148, at 87.
152. The source of this information preferred to remain anonymous.
153. Statistics Canada, supra, note 109, at 38-39, table 8. In terms of capital loss
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show that many pension funds have been used as a handy dumping
ground for the bonds of corporations" 1.54
Government is also guilty of self-serving investment. The
evaluation of prospective investments generally is a comparison of
55
expected rate of return to both risk and the need for liquidity:'
(i) Rate of return: Government pensions are universally
invested heavily in fixed but low return Government bonds. In
1971, Government pension funds were invested 12% in stocks and
68% in bonds, most of which were Government bonds. Private
plans invested 36% in stocks and 39% in bonds.' 5 6 The
Metropolitan Toronto Police Fund has been invested 80% in
15 7
Toronto Municipal bonds and 20% in other Government issues.
The result is that bond-concentrated public pension funds earn lower
returns on investments than do private plans invested in equities.
Thus the Canada Pension Plan' 57 fund, invested in provincial bonds
pursuant to the Canada Pension Plan, 158 s. 112, earns an annual
return of 4.4% while the equity-concentrated fund of the Quebec
Pension Plan earns 11.27%. 159
(ii) Risk: The risk involved in equity investment is minimal, for
two reasons. First, a pension plan permits long term investment;
stock purchased by the contributions of a twenty year old employee
need not be liquidated for forty-five years. Thus sporadic recessions
are immaterial to a pension fund manager. Only the long run is
crucial, and the last century has shown a general trend of inflation.
Equities usually thrive on inflation. Second, the remaining risk is
erased by the Government's taxing and minting powers.
(iii) Needfor liquidity: A pension becomes payable on the fixed
date of the employee's retirement. Liability cannot accrue
unexpectedly with, for example, a sudden stock market panic.
Moreover, during the first twenty years after the initiation of a
pension plan (before the original generation of contributing
as a percentage of total expenditure, industrial pension funds fared six times worse
than "religious and charitable pension funds" and seven times worse than
"educational pension funds".
154. Finn, supra, note 134, at 357.
155. P. Dietz. Pension Funds; Measuring Investment Performance (Toronto:
Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1966), at 31-43.
156. Statistics Canada, supra, note 109, at 18.
157. Baum,supra, note 106, at 152-54.
158. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-5.
159. The 4th Estate, 17 January 1974, at 12; also Canadian Labour Congress,
supra, note 24, at 5.
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employees reaches retirement) the fund's income exceeds expendi160
ture. Thus liquidity is rarely crucial to a pension fund.
For these reasons, Governments should invest pension funds in
equities. 16 1 Instead they invest heavily in Government bonds,
which provide a lower return to the pension fund. This is a
"dramatic example of government financing itself at favorable
interest rates through the use of government-operated pension
funds".

162

Self-serving investments may be very costly. Even apart from
compounded interest, each $100 contribution of a twenty-five year
old employee will return $100 more by age 65 if it is invested at
71/2% than if it is invested at 5%.
With many unit benefit plans, however, the return on investment
is immaterial to the employee, because all income to the fund
defrays the employer's contributions. J. K. Bell stated that under
the local Eaton's plan, the Company and the employees initially
contributed equal amounts; but the mounting return on investments
has reduced the Company's contributions to one ninth of the
employees' contributions. As the employer has promised to pay
only the difference between the amount of the benefit and the assets
of the fund 163 his position is contractually unimpeachable. To an
employee unseasoned in the construction may appear deceitful. The
former Chairman of the Natinal Capital Commission has stated:
Many pension funds are run by company executives lacking
professional investment experience. Conflicts of interest abound.
Many firms use the buying power of their pension fund to
strengthen their business connections; governments use theirs as
a convenient dumping place for their bond issues. Few pension
funds ever expose their income record to public (or even
employee) view, or apply the most elementary performance tests.
thus is able to conceal its mistakes, hindering
Bad management 164
corrective action.
4. Disclosure The Pension Benefits Standards Act 16 5 requires the
employer to give to each employee a written explanation of the
plan. The Income Tax Act requires no disclosure to the employee.
160. In 1971, employer contributions alone more than offset the total expenditures
of trusteed pension plans. Statistics Canada, supra, note 109, at 30, table 2.

161. See also Mercer, supra, note 41, at 83-91.
162. Baum,supra, note 106, at 152.

163. See, for example, s. 12 of the Dosco plan in Appendix B.
164. Finn, supra, note 134, at 357, quoting Douglas Fullerton.
165. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, s. 1 (c).
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A survey of the New York State Insurance Department found that
of the 188 surveyed plans which did not guarantee the payment of
pensions, 70 plans provided employees with booklets stating or
implying that benefits were promised without restriction, 34 plans
were silent and only 84 plans informed the employees of the
truth. 16 6 Dalhousie's plan is eleven pages long, yet its terms are
summarized for employees in two pages of the "Staff Handbook".
According to the Superintendent of the Dalhousie Plan, the trust
indenture of the fund is not open to inspection by employees or their
representatives. Section 9 of the indenture states that the trustees'
records (respecting investment performance, etc.) may be viewed
only by persons designated by the University. 1 6 7 J. K. Bell stated
that Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. recently replaced the underwriter
of its pension plan without notification to either the employees or
their union. In Nova Scotia most employees are ignorant of the
details of their pension plan and its administration.
One person who was interviewed stated that non-disclosure is
justified to avoid confusing the simple-minded employees with the
complicated financial and administrative details of pension plans.
The argument is unsound. Throughout his career the employee
naturally assumes that the contributions made for his pension will
eventually purchase a pension. Thus he does not stockpile personal
savings. J. K. Bell stated that employees are usually first informed
of their rights and duties under the pension plan several months
before their retirement. The 64 year old employee who discovers
that his anticipated pension is not forthcoming because of a break in
continuous service, insufficient funding or failure to follow the
application procedure suffers irremediable loss; he has not time to
hoard savings for a decent retirement income. 1 68 To prevent
feelings of false security among employees, the Nova Scotia
Federation of Labour has petitioned the provincial Cabinet for "a
disclosure requirement to all employees showing at least annual
receipts, disbursements, investment earnings, portfolio of investments, and the assets and liabilities of the plan." 1 6 9
166. Harbrecht, supra, note 148, at 59.

167. The Acadia University Faculty, on the other hand, has insisted upon and
obtained disclosure of the facts pertinent to the administration of the Acadia
pension plan.
168. See the examples of the inequities of non-disclosure in Nader, supra, note 7,
at 7-8, 30-40, 89.

169. Presentation of Nova Scotia Federation of Labour to the Government of Nova
Scotia, 10 January, 1973, at 33.
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5. The Recourses of the Employee in Law
There is a paucity of Canadian case law interpreting private
pensions. British cases concern primarily statutory superannuation.
Only the United States has a fully-developed body of private
pension case law. Because of the questionable authority in Nova
Scotia of American law, much of the following discussion is
speculative.
(i) An early dictum: "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will
with mine own?" [The Master quoting the employer in the Parable
of Labourers, Holy Bible, King James Version, St. Mathew, c. 20,
v. 15]
(ii) The collective agreement
Relationship with the individual pension: The Supreme
Court of Canada has held that a collective agreement wherein the
employer promised "to continue his support of" an existing
individual pension plan incorporated the individual plan into the
collective agreement and permitted its enforcement through
arbitration. 170 The status of a pre-existing individual pension which
is not incorporated into the collective agreement is uncertain. The
Supreme Court of Canada has held that after execution of a
collective agreement "there is no room left" for terms of individual
employment contracts.1 71 An arbitrator in Re CUPE Local 1000
and Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario172 held that an
individual pension plan is valid insofar as it does no conflict with
the collective agreement. Because arbitrators have no jurisdiction to
interpret individual pension plans, 173 Hydro-Electric has questionable weight. The Ontario Labour Relations Board has held,
however, that an individual plan may be concurrent with a
collective agreement, and that an employer commits anti-union
discrimination when he discontinues an individual plan for
employees in a unit who are covered by a separate pension plan in a
74
collective agreement. 1
170. Re International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Flin
Flon Lodge 1848 et al and Hudson's Bay Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd., [1968]
S.C.R. 113; 66 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
171. Le Syndicat Catholique des Employs de Magasins de Quebec Inc. v. La
Compagnie Paquet Lte., [1959] S.C.R. 206 at 212; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346, at

353-54.
172. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 244 (Thomas).
173. Re Sudbury Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union and FalconbridgeNickel
Mines Ltd. (1958), 9 L.A.C. 105. (Little).
174. IBEW Local 1966 v. Johnson ControlsLtd. (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 16,041.
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General phrases in collective agreements: A collective agreement will often state no more than that an employer must purchase a
group annuity from an insurance company, at a specified premium
or amount of benefit. If the collective agreement binds the employer
to provide a benefit, but does not specify the underwriter, then the
employer must provide the benefit even in circumstances excluded
by the insurance contract that he later executes. 175 The employer is
also bound when the insurance contract does not contain a term
required by the collective agreement. 176 When the collective
agreement states that the pension shall be provided by an insurance
company and the policy contains the terms required by the
collective agreement, the emp!oyer is not bound when the employee
177
is denied a benefit by a "loophole" term in the insurance policy.
1
78
Sexual discrimination:The Trade Union Act,
s. 24 (7) nullifies
a collective agreement that discriminates sexually. One pension
consultant interviewed stated that, since the recent amendment to
the Human Rights Act 1 79 barring sexual discrimination, many plans
have "equalized" their terms by, for example, adding "widower's
benefits" to existing "widow's benefits". These and other
unionized plans had ignored the pre-existing s. 24 (7) of the Trade
Union Act. As pension plans abound in sexual discrimination
respecting retirement age, benefit rates, disability benefits and
survivor's beneftis,' 8 0 one may speculate on the number of legally
deceased collective agreements with pension plans now governing
the industrial relations of Nova Scotia.
There may be also be discrimination against men. The mortality
tables show that women outlive men. If their rates of contribution
and benefit are equal, a woman will before her death receive more
per dollar of contribution than will a man. It is therefore agruable
that equal rates of contribution and benefit discriminate against men
and nullify the collective agreement. The argument would probably
175. Re InternationalAssociation of MachinistsLodge 171 and Fleet Manufactur-

ing Ltd. (1967), 18 L.A.C. 311 (O'Shea)
176. Re Corporationof the City of London and CUPELocal 107 (1972), 2 L.A.C.

(2d) 325 (Hinnegan), at 328.
177. Re CanadianOhio BrassCo. and InternationalChemical Workers Local 345
(1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 27 (Weatherill); RE Bendix Automotive of CanadaLtd. and
UAW Local 195 (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 21 (Weatherill); Re Lufkin Rule Co. of

Canadaand USWLocal6709 (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 295 (Brown).
178. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19.

179. S.N.S. 1969, c. 11,asam, S.N.S. 1972, c. 65.
180. Statistics Canada, supra, note 1, at 44-49.
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fail in Nova Scotia; one usually reliable source stated that the Nova
Scotia Labour Relations Board would "look long and hard" at a
collective agreement that differentiated the benefit rates of the sexes
before allowing it to survive s. 24(7).
Duration of the employer's liability: When a collective agreement
ends, the employer's liability to pay the pension ceases. 18' An
arbitrator appointed under a new collective agreement has no
jurisdiction to hear a dispute respecting a breach of the pension plan
82
in the previous agreement. 1
The status of an employee under a collective agreement
negotiated after his retirement is suspect. In Allied Chemical and
Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical
Division'83 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a retired employee is
not an "employee" and not in the "unit", and that pensions for
retired employees are not subjects of mandatory bargaining. In
Howe Sound Co. v. InternationalUnion of Mine Mill and Smelter
Workers Local 663184 the B.C. Supreme Court examined the
equivalents of ss. l(1)(e), l(l)(x), 22(2), 39, and 40 of the Nova
Scotia Trade Union Act, stated that a union may negotiate a
collective agreement only for "actual employees", and held that
persons not actively employed by the employer are "in no way
bound by, affected by, or entitled to" the pensions conferred by the
collective agreement.' 85 In two footnotes Pittsburgh Plate Glass
stated that pensions were ubjects of "permissive" bargaining
under the National Labour Relations Act.' 8 6 It is therefore
conceivable that, notwithstanding Howe Sound, a union-negotiated
pension may be enforced personally by the union on the employee's
behalf. If the retiree is not an "employee" or in the "unit" then the
union derives no legal capacity from the Trade Union Act, s. 25(a)
181. Re Coulter ManufacturingLtd. and UAW Local 222 (1972), 1 L.A.C. 426
(Weatherill), at 430. As a strike is not conterminous with the termination of the
collective agreement, it appears that the Trade Union Act, s. 51 (3)(d)(i) does not
rivivify the employer's pension liability.
182. Re UAW and Acme Screw and Gear Ltd. (1964), 15 L.A.C. 351 (Little), at
362-63.
183. 92 S. Ct. 383 (1971).
184. (1961), 27 D.L.R. (2d) 453; 61 C.L.L.C. 15,338, rev'd on the issue of
certiorari, [1962]S.C.R. 318, affig (1961-62), 36 W.W.R. 181 (C.A.). Neither
appellate court discussed the enforceability of pensions.
185. (1961), 27 D.L.R. (2d) 453, at 456; 61 C.L.L.C. 15,338, at 197.
186. 92 S. Ct. 383 (1971), at 393, n.ll; at 398-99, n.20. See also Re Coulter
Manufacturing Ltd. and UAW Local 222 (1972), 1 L.A.C. 426 (Weatherill), at
429.
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to bargain on his behalf; the union must rely upon its common law
capacity to contract under InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters
Local 213 v. Therien18 7 and O'Laughin v. The Halifax
Longshoremen'sAssociation. 188
Duty of fair representation: In practice a retired employee has
nothing to offer his employer; he has no bargaining power and needs
the union. Yet if he is not an "employee" or in the "unit" then he
is unaffected by ss. 25(a) and 39 of the Trade Union Act, and is
legally free to bargain. Thus the theoretical base for the duty of fair
representation - "exclusivity" - is undercut. For the retired
employee, the already-uncertain status of the duty of fair
representation in Nova Scotia is further jeopardized.
(iii) Individual contract A pension plan which explicitly states
that it is a contract is, of course, a contract, assuming that there is
offer and acceptance, consideration and intent to create legal
relations. If the employee's consideration is a promise than it is a
bilateral contract. Pension plans rarely state that they are contracts
or require a promise from the employee; almost all pensions not in
collective agreements have been voluntarily instituted by the
employer. What is their contractual status?
Gift or gratuity: Several American cases have held that
noncontributory pensions are gratuities with "none of the essential
elements of a contract". 18 9 Under this theory the pension is
enforceable only as a "gift" and the employer may revoke his
promise before "delivery" of the pension.
Unilateral contract: The bulk of American authority holds that
pensions are unilateral contracts, the consideration from the
1 90
employee being mere service with the employer until vesting.
187. [1960]S.C.R. 265; 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
188. (1972),3 N.S.R. (2d)766(App. Div.); 28D.L.R. (3d)315.
189. Neuffer v. Bakery and Confectionery Works International Union, 193 F.

Supp. 699 (D.D.C. 1961), at 700; Schneider v. McKesson, 32 L.C. 94,422
(D.N.Y. 1957); Kravitz v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 31 L.C. 93,290
(N.Y. S.C. 1957); Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica, 117 N.E. 2d 880 (I11.App.
Ct. 1954); Umshler v. Umshler, 76 N.E. 2d 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947); Dolan v.
Heller Bros., 104 A 2d 860 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1954).
190. Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. 194 N.E. 441 (Ohio C.A. 1934); Gilbert v.
Norfolk & W. Railway Co., 171 S.E. 814 (W. Va. S.C. 1933); Lowndes
Cooperative Association v. Lipsey, 126 So. 2d 276 (Miss. S.C. 1911); Hobbs v.
Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 234
F. 2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956); Hundle v. Morrison Steel Co., 223 A. 2d 193 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1966); Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P. 2d 807 (D.C.A. Cal. 1948), at
814-15.
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Even non-contributory pensions have been held to be unilateral
contracts. 19 1 If Lord Denning's subsidiary contract of Errington v.
Errington192 has ensconced itself in Nova Scotia then the employer
may not revoke his promise to pay a pension before vesting. The
American courts, however, have permitted the employer to deny a
pension to an employee discharged before vesting. 19 3 In Gorr v.
Consolidated Foods Co. the employer separated 87% of his
workforce before vesting. The court held that the employees
forfeited the employer's contributions, but emphasized that, as the
money had been deposited for the "exclusive benefit of the
employees", Consolidated Foods could not withdraw the forfeited
money from the fund. 194 So the money remained in the fund, and
defrayed Consolidated Foods' future contributions for the leftover
19 5
employees.
Nullification of contract clauses: If the offeror may revoke his
196
obligations at will there is no promise and therefore no contract.
Pension plans not in collective agreements invariably permit the
employer to "modify or terminate" the plan at will. 19 7 The
contractual status of a pension therefore depends on the effect given
to the "modify or terminate" clause. When a plan permits the
employer to modify vested benefits: if the plan states the formula for
modification, a modification according to the formula, and the
pension plan generally, are upheld contractually; 19 8 if the plan
specifies no formula, then the employer's unfettered discretion
nullifies the contract for lack of a promise from the employer. 199 A
plan that does not state that the employer may modify vested rights
191. Lloyd v.Heywood-Wakefield Co., 42 L.C. 24,639 (D. Mass. 1961); Siegel v.
FirstPennsylvaniaBanking and Trust Co., 44 L.C. 26,299 (D. Pa. 1961).

192. (1952

1 K.B. 290 (C.A.).

193. Weberv. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 47 L.C. 28, 825 (Pa. C.P.
1965); Schneider v. McKesson, 254 F. 2d 827 (2d. Cir. 1958); Local Lodge 2040
Of InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Servel Inc., 268 F. 2d 692 (7th Cir.
1959) certioraridenied 361 U.S. 884 (1959); Karcz v. Luther ManufacturingCo.,
155 N.E. 2d 441 (Mass. S,J.C. 1959); Bailey v. Rockwell Spring and Axle Co.,
175 N.Y.S. 2d 104 (S.C. 1958).
194. 91 N.W. 2d 772 (Minn. S.C. 1958).
195. M. Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down; Problems
and Some Proposals, (1963), 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952, at 955, n. 12.
196. Randall v. Morgan (1805), 12 Ves. Jun. 67; 33 E.R. 26 (Ch.).

197. See the Dosco Plan, ss. 36, 39 in Appendix B.
198. Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 136 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ill. 1955), affd

234 F. 2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956).
199. Umshler v.Unshler, 76 N.E. 2d 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947)
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will be interpreted to permit modification of only non-vested
promises; the vested rights are contractually intact. 20 0 Many plans
specify that the pension "shall not be deemed to constitute a
contract". The Dosco Plan limits the employer's liability at least
five times. 20 1 "No contract" clauses have been upheld. 20 2 The
better view, however, is that the "no contract" clause conflicts with
the plan's "vesting" clause; nothing can "vest" if there is no
contract. The next step is to uphold the "vesting" clause and ignore
the "no contract" clause. 20 3 Nullification clauses have no place
under the Pension Benefits Standards Act, which requires
20 4
'contractual" obligations.
Termination of employment does not terminate the employee's
20 5
right to a pension.
The "deferred wages" theory: Pensions have been characterized
as "wages" almost everywhere but in court. In days of old,
pensions remunerated the current services of, for example, spies,
"the first dukes of the kingdom" and ladies "of a less dignified
character". 20 6 More recently, unions 20 7 and employees 20 8 have
asserted that pensions are deferred wages earned by the employee
during his years of service. It has been held that pensions are
"wages" for the purpose of mandatory bargaining under the
National Labour Relations Act. 20 9 If pensions are "wages" it
theoretically follows that the consideration from the employee is his
current service, and that employment until vesting is unnecessary to
cement the contract; yet, only one court in a dictum has adopted this
200. See generally Little and Siefert v. Kent McClain of Canada Ltd. (1972),

C.C.H. Employment Benefits and Pension Guide, para. 1360 (Ont. H.C.); Cantor
v. Berkshire Life Insurance Co., 171 N.E. 2d 518 (Ohio S.C. 1960); Adelaide
Weesner v. Electric Power Board of Chatanooga 41 L.C. 23, 739 (Tenn. C.A.

1961).
201. See Appendix B, ss. 36, 37. See also ss. 28, 33.
202. Hughes v.Encyclopedia Britannica, 117 N.E. 2d 880 (111. App Ct. 1954).
.203. California-Western States Life Insurance Co. v. Gibbons, 29 L.C. 90, 831
(Cal. Super Ct. 1955); Siegel v. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., 44

L.C. 26,299 (D.Pa. 1961).
204. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, ss. 10, 11.
205. Taylor v. McQuilken (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 463 (Man Q.B.), at 466.
206. Sir Lewis Namier, The Structure of British Politics at the Accession of
George III (2d ed., London: MacMillan, 1957), at 185-87.

207. G. Milling, "Labour's Interest inPension Planning", inCoward,supra, note
27, at 186.

208. Nader, supra, note 3, at 12.
209. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir 1948); Richfield Oil Corp.
v.NLRB, 231 F. 2d 717 (D.C.C.A. 1956), at724.
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reasoning. 2 10 Other cases speak of pensions as "deferred wages"
but nullify the concept by holding that the employer's liability
crystallizes only on the vesting date. 2 11 Of particular importance to
a Nova Scotian employee is the status of a pension owed by an
2 12
insolvent employer, as "pay" under the Labour Standards Code,
ss. 1(n), 77 and 84. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
the purpose of giving wages priority in bankruptcy proceedings is to
ensure that the employee has sufficient funds to survive the period
of unemployment that follows his discharge by the bankrupt
employer; as pensions are not payable until retirement, pension are
beyond the purpose of bankruptcy statues giving priority to
"wages".213
In parlance pensions are "deffered wages". In law the employee
depends upon unilateral contract.
(iv) The "modify or terminate" clause;for example, the Dosco
Plan, ss. 36, 39
"Modification"; special problems under collective agreements:
Collective agreements frequently state that the employer is "bound
to continue existing welfare plans". If the pre-existing pension plan
permitted the employer to modify his obligations at will, a question
arises as to whether the employer may unilaterally amend the plan
which has become part of the collective agreement. The general
principle is that when the collective agreement binds the employer
in general terms to "abide by the pension plan" the employer may
unilaterally amend the pension plan; only terms of the pension plan
that are specified in the collective agreement are exempt from the
employer's power of modiciation. 2 1 4 The employer's power to
amend an individual contract has been discussed above.
210. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp. 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967), at 345.
211. See the Hurd case, supra, note 198, at 134; Ledwith v. Bankers Life
InsuranceCo., 54 N.W. 2d 409 (Neb. S.C. 1952), at 417-18.
212. S.N.S. 1972, c. 10.
213. JointIndustry Board of ElectricalIndustry v. U.S., 88 S. Ct. 1491 (1968).
214. Re USW Local 4906 and Timken Roller Bearing Co. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 157
(Reville); Re Hamilton Type Preparation Workers Local 669 and Hamilton
Spectator, 1966, 17 L.A.C. 323. (Little); Re UAW Local 199 and Columbus

McKinnon Ltd. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 213 (Lang). These three cases permitted
modification. The following cases denied the employer a right to modify: Re Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters Local 1137 and Township of Etobicoke (1966), 17 L.A.C.
199 (Lane); Re UAW Local 27 and Tecumseh Products of Canada Ltd. (1966) 17
L.A.C. 144 (Lang); Re InternationalAss's of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Flin Flon Lodge 1848 and Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd., [1968]
S.C.R. 113; 66 D.L.R. (2d) 1.

Pensions: A Primer for Lawyers 409

"Termination" of a pension plan by the employer The Pension
Benefits Standards Act2 15 states that, upon termination: cessation of
the employer's contributions is deemed to terminate a pension
plan;2 1 6 the employer must defray his unfunded liability, to vested
and non-vested employees;2 17 the fund moneys are used to pay all
the pensions to which the employees are entitled;2 1 8 no money is
refunded to the employer until the pensions are paid;2 19 an
amendment to a plan made for the purpose of avoiding obligations
under the Act is void.22 0 For continued registration under the
Income Act, the assets of a terminated pension plan must be
transferred to the fund of a new pension plan. 2 2 1 Pension plans
invariably state the priorities for the distribution of assets upon
"termination". 222 A question thus arises as to whether a mass
layoff is a "termination" of the plan, permitting the severed
employees to share the assets, or a continuation of the plan where
the non-vested employees receive nothing. In Gorr v. Consolidated
Foods Co. 223 and in George v. Habe2 24 the employers laid off 87%
and 95% of their work forces respectively. The courts held that
neither mass severance constituted a "termination" of the pension
plan.
When an employee whose pension is not vested is laid off
immediately before the termination of the plan, he may not share in
the distribution of the assets.2 2 5 After paying the pensions due to the
employees, the employer may recover the surplus of a group
annuity fund. 22 6 The collocation of these two factors permits the
employer to recapture much of the assets of the pension fund. In
1954 Studebaker-Packard Co. employed 10,250 employees at the
Packard plant. The Company wished to discontinue its Packard
plant, so it laid off thousands of employees before terminating its
pension plan. At the plan's termination only 625 employees
215. R.S.C.1970, c. P-8.
216. S.O.R./67-328, s. I1(1).
217. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, s. 12(b).
218. R.S.C. 1970, c. p-8, s. 12(a).
219. S.O.R./67-328, ss. 9(4), 11(2).
220. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, s. 19.
221. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29, at para. 16.
222. See for example ss. 39-41 of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
223. 91 N.W. 3d772 (Minn. S.C. 1958).
224. 72 N.W. 2d 121 (Mich. S.C. 1955).
225. Finnell v. CrametInc. 289 F. 2d 409 (6th Cir. 1961).
226. Hudson v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 46 L.C. 28,610, (8th
Cir. 1963).
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remained to receive pensions. The forfeited pensions reverted to the
Company. International Harvester Co. in 1962 and the Saturday
22 7
Evening Post in 1969 used the same tactic.
(v) Quasi-contract It is arguable that the employer or the trust
fund is unjustly enriched when an employee discharged before
vesting forfeits the employer's contributions.2 28 Borngesser v.
United Dairy Workers Pension Fund Commmittee 2 29 stated that
there was no unjust enrichment when the employer defrayed his
future contributions by the amount of a discharged employee's
forfeited pension. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp. 23 0 intimated, however,
that the windfall accruing to an employer from a mass layoff might
constitute unjust enrichment.
(vi) The employee's right to recover his contributions In Pennie
v. Reis 2 3 1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employee who was
denied a pension could not receive his contributions. The reason
was that he had never possessed the money, which had been
deducted from his wages. One would think that a modern court
would assert the employee's quasi-contractual right to recover his
contributions, but the result of the complicated facts of Genevese v.
Martin-MarietteCo. 23 2 was judicial ruling that the employer could
take the entire benefit of the employee's contributions. The question
of an employee's quasi-contractual right to recover his contributions
would rarely arise in Nova Scotia because pension plans always
expressly permit a refund of contributions when the employee
forfeits the pension. An expressly authorized refund is, of course,
233
enforced.
(vii) Post-retirement forfeiture of the pension Many plans
prohibit the retired employee from resuming employment with a
competitor of his first employer, the wages of sin being forfeiture of
his pension. American courts have generally upheld the restrictive
convenants. 23 4 The New York Supreme Court in Kristt v.
227. Nader, supra, note 3, at 51-53.
228. Bernstein, supra, note 195, at 962-68.
229. 135 N.W. 2d 381 (Mich. S.C. 1965); See also Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Co., 69
L.C. 25, 287 (3rd Cir. 1972).
230. 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967), at 346.
231. 132U.S.464(1889).
232. 63 L.C. 19,664 (D. Pa 1969).
233. Jamieson v. Dominion Steel and Coal Co. (1971), 2 N.S.R. (2d) 517 (App.
Div.); 19 D.L.R. (3d) 203.
234. Garner v. Girard Trust Bank, 65 L.C. 20,909 (Pa. C.P. 1971); Kumm v.
Allen, 46 L.C. 28,326 (N.Y. S.C. 1962); cf. Calfornia-Western States Life
InsuranceCo. v. Gibbons, 29 L.C. 90,831 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1955).
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Whelan2 3 5 found the covenant justifiable because it allowed the
employee unfettered freedom of choice: he could choose a pension
without re-employment or re-employment without a pension. In
Canada2 3 6 and in England 23 7 restrictive covenants in pension plans
have been declared void as being in restraint of trade.
(viii) Review of 'final" decisions of the administrative board
Many plans state that the administrative board's interpretation of the
plan is "final and conclusive". 23 8 An American court will not, in
the wake of such a clause, reverse the decision of an administrative
board unless the board acted in bad faith. 23 9 Russell v. Princeton
Laboratories2 40 provides an example of reversal because of bad
faith: the pension plan stated that the employee would forfeit his
pension if, in the "final" opinion of the board, he had
"voluntarily" terminated his employment; the employee terminated
because his poor health could not tolerate the unsanitary conditions
of the plant; the court reversed the board's finding of "voluntary"
termination and its decision to deny the pension. The only American
departure from the general position is a decision that a court may
reverse a decision of an administrative board in the absence of bad
faith if the decision concerns a major matter affecting all the
2 41
employees (for example, integration with a public pension plan).
The only Canadian court to meet such a clause in a pension plan
2 42
simply ignored it, without tedious rationalization.
(ix) Tort An employee who selects among optional forms of
pension benefits in reliance upon the misleading information of the
235. 32 L.C. 94,493 (N.Y. S.C. 1957).
236. Taylor v. McQuilkin (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 463 (Man. Q.B).
237. Bull v. Pitney-Bowes, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Q.B.D.).
238. See, for example, s. 24(a) of the Dosco Plan in Appendix B.
239. Magnolia Petroleum v. Butler, 86 S.W. 2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), at
262;Dowling v. Texas and N.O.R. Co., 80 S.W. 2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), at
458-59; Webster v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 153 S.W. 2d 498 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941); Menke v. Thompson, 140 F. 2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944), at 791; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Robertson, 225 S.W. 649 (Ark. S.C. 1920), at 652;Aston
v. Magnolium Petroleum Co., 241 S.W. 2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), at 308;
Spiner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 73 S.W. 2d 566 (Tex. Civ App. 1934), at
568-69; Park v. Board of Trustees of Pension Trust Fundfor Operating Engineers,
67 L.C. 23,224 (Cal. C.A. 1971); Norman v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 322 S.W. 2d 95 (KY. C.A, 1959).
240. 56 L.C. 19,866 (N.J. S.C. 1967). See also Moore v. PostalTelegraph-Cable
Co., 24 S.R. 2d 361 (S. Car. S.C. 1943), at 364;Forrishv. Kennedy, 105 A. 2d 67
(1954); Siegel v. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., 44 L.C. 26,229 (D.
Pa. 1961).
241. The Hurd, case, supra, note 198, at 154-55.
242. The Taylor case, supra, note 236, at 468.
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employer, may have an action for negligent misstatement and may
recover damages for his loss caused by making an impolitic
choice.243

(x) The employee's recourse against the insurance company
"Life insurance" is defined in the Insurance Act 24 4 as "insurance
whereby an insurer undertakes to pay insurance money.

. .at

a fixed

determinable future time; or for a term dependent on human life". If
a group annuity is "life insurance" then an employee may take
advantage of third party beneficiary status under Part VIII of the
Insurance Act. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated, however,
that a pension annuity is not "life insurance" within the similar
definition in the Ontario Insurance Act. 245 Unless the employee has
privity of contract with the insurance company he has no direct
remedy. Several American cases have found the required privity by
depicting the annuity policy as a tripartite contract between the
employer, the employee and the insurance company. 2 46 No
Canadian case has shown similar inclinations. As only the employer
and the insurance company sign the group annuity policy, it is
probable that a Canadian employee is not a party to the contract and
must rely upon his employer's willingness to sue the insurance
company.
A segregated funds policy eradicates every remaining recourse of
the employee. A standard form segregated funds policy states that
the insurance company has custody of the funds and "in its sole
discretion will determine the nature of the investments". Yet
247
nowhere does the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act
or the policy constitute the insurance company as a trustee; the
employee has no equitable rights. Subject to the tenuous argument
of tripartite contract, the employee has no direct contractual rights.
As the insurance company does not guarantee even the captial of the
fund, the employer is also bereft of contractual rights. The
insurance company manages the money but is virtually immune
from liability.
(xi) The employee's recourse against the trustee The Department of National Revenue requires that if a fund is held by
243. Gediman v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 44 L.C. 26,037 (2d. Cir 1962).
244. R.S.N.S. 1967, c 148, s.2(n).
245. Gray v. Kerslake, [1957] S.C.R. 516; 11 D.L.R. (2d) 225.
246. Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909 (D. PA. 1956), at 911;
Hudson v. John Hancock Mutual Life InsuranceCo., 314 F. 2d 16 (8th Cir. 1963),
at 20. The Gorr casesupra, note 194, at 777.
247. R. S. C. 1970, c. 1-15.
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individual trustees, three of the trustees must reside in Canada, and
one must be unaffiliated with the employer.2 48 The Trustee Act, s.
65249 states that the common law rules relating to perpetuities and
accumulations do not apply to trusteed pension plans.
When the trust deed conflicts with the terms of the pension plan,
the trust deed "stands alone" in determining the equitable rights of
the employees. 250 The Trustee Act 25 1 and the Variation of Trusts
Act 25 2 state the circumstances when a court may depart from the
terms of a trust indenture. At common law a court will enforce the
terms of the indenture except in cases of "emergency". 25 3 Thus, at
common law, when the indenture states that investments will be
directed by the settlor, the trustee is bound to invest according to the
settlor's instructions2 54 and an unauthorized investment may be a
breach of trust. 2 55 Even the investment standards in the Trustee Act
2 56
apply only insofar as there is no conflict with the trust indenture.
Unless the indenture is statutorily varied, an employer in Nova
Scotia may lawfully direct the use of the trust moneys by inserting
the appropriate clauses in the indenture. As the indenture is usually
the employer's creation, the retention of supervisory power is quite
common. The pension consultants interviewed stated that most
individual trustees in Nova Scotia may invest only as instructed.
The Dalhousie plan's trust deed permits the trustees to pay money
from the fund " on the order of the University" (s.2), and allows
the University unilaterally to select, remove and replace the trustees
(s. 6).
The standard form indentures of corporate trustees often attempt
to exempt the trustee from liability or an accounting to
beneficiaries. Although there is authority for upholding the
248. Circular 72-13R2, supra, note 29, at para 6(e)(ii)(B)
249. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 317.
250. InternationalBrotherhoodof Boilermakers v. Yarrow Ltd. (1963), 39 D.L.R.
(2d) 470 (B.C.S.C.), at 471,473.
251. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 317, s. 50.
252. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 323.
253. Re New, [1910] 2 Ch. 534 (C.A.), at 544; Chapman v. Chapman, [1954]
A.C. 429 (H.L.); InternationalBrotherhood of Boilermakers, supra, note 250, at
474.
254. Beauclerk v. Ashburnham (1845), 8 Beav. 322; 50 E.R. 126 (Rolls Ct.);
Cadogan v. Essex (1854), 2 Drew 227; 61 E.R. 706 (V.Ch. Ct.);Re Hurst (1890),
63 L.T. 665 (Ch.D.); G. Keeton, The Law of Trusts (9th ed. Bath: Pitman, 1968),
at 256-59 and cases cited; P. Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (2nd ed. London:
Butterworth's, 1970), at 246-48 and cases cited.
255. Re Salmon (1889), 42 Ch. D. 351.
256. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 317, ss. 2, 5-9.
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exemption clauses, 25 7 most courts rule that clauses which limit a
2 58
pensioner's recourse against the trustee are void.
When the deed permits the trustees to draft rules for carrying out
the purposes of the plan, the trustees, in New Jersey at least, have
an affirmative duty to make "full disclosure of all facts which are
material for beneficiaries to know for the protection of their
interests" .259 The court held that an employee who failed to meet
an eligibility requirement of which he had no notice was entitled to a
declaration of his right to receive a pension.
6. Conclusion. Timid unions have failed to assert the
employee's right to control the administration of his pension. The
common law is a whirl of judicial diffidence and exemptions from
liability. Registration under the Income Tax Act is voluntary at the
employer's discretion, and lower taxes from the employer require
higher levies on other taxpayers; so the value of the Act's bought
virtue is questionable. The result is that the employer may legally
dictate the terms of the plan. The alternative to legislated protection
of pensions is poverty for many retired employees. The obvious
remedy is the passage of a Nova Scotia Pension Benefits Standards
2
Act. 6o
257. Wilkins v. Hogg (1861), 3 Giff. 116; 66 E.R. 346 (Ch.); Brown v. Brown,
[1931] O.R. 759 (Ont. S.C.); 4 D.L.R. 420, at 425 (dicta);Parke and A. Mellows,

The Modern Law of Trusts (2d ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1970), at 415.
258. Jones v. Shipping Federation of British Columbia (1963), 41 W.W.R. 636
(B.C.S.C.); 37 D.L.R. (2d) 273; the Taylor case, supra, note 236, at 468;Kent v.
UniversalFilm Mfg. Co., 193 N.Y. Supp. 838 (App. Div. 1922); United Garment
Workers of America Local No. 140 v. Jacob Reid's Sons, 83 F. Supp. 49 (D. Pa.

1949), at 52.
259. Branch v. White, L.C. 21,064 (N.J. App. Div. 1968) at 21,068.

260. Between the writing and publication of this paper Bill 29 (1975) was
introduced in the Nova Scotia Legislature. It is virtually indentical to the Ontario
Pension Benefits Act and greatly resembles the federal Pension Benefits Standards
Act discussed throughout this paper.
The salient provisions of Bill 29, with their equivalents in the federal Pension
Benefits Standards Act are:
1. For the purpose of the Act, a person is "employed" in the province where
he reports to work or, if he does not report to work, in the province which is the
source of his remuneration: Bill 29, s. 3.
2. The Superintendent of Pensions may inspect documents and require the
filing of information respecting the pension plan. Employees must be informed of
the provisions of the plan: Bill 29, ss. 7(2), 15, 18(l)(b); PBSA, ss. 4, 7, 11 (c), 16.
3. Pensions must vest at a minimum of forty-five years of age and ten years of
continuous service; Bill 29, s. 17(1)(a); PBSA, s. 10(l)(a).
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4. Except for voluntary payments, the employee's contributions are "locked
in": Bill 29, ss. 17(2), 17(3)(b), 17(4); PBSA, ss. 10(l)(b-d), 10(2)(b,c).
5. When permitted by the plan the employee may elect a joint and survivorship
benefit or a benefit for a guaranteed period: Bill 29, s. 17(5); PBSA, s. 10(2)(d).
6. Integration is permitted for benefits earned after 1966: Bill 29, ss. 7(6),
18(3); PBSA, s. 10(2)(e).
7. Investments will be governed by regulations: Bill 29, s. 18(1)(c); PBSA. s.
II(b).
8. When the plan is wound up or when the employer is convicted of a
contravention of the Act, he must pay into the fund all money that he wrongfully
withheld: Bill 29, ss. 17(7), 18(2), 25(2); PBSA. s. 12.
9. When an employer stops or is about to stop all or part of his business
operations, the Superintendent may declare that the employer's pension plan is
wound up: Bill 29, s. 19.
10. Funding must comply with the regulations and must be adequate to pay all
benefits promised by the plan: Bill 29, ss. 18(l)(a), 25(2); PBSA, s. 1 (a).
11. The manner of calculating contributions and benefits shall not be in the
discretion of the employer: Bill 29, s. 20(b).

Appendix A
Income Tax Act
S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63
Generally, the contributions of both the employer and the employee and the
earnings of the fund are deductible from income. Benefits paid to employees after
retirement are taxable. There are two advantages to the employee:
1. No tax is paid on the income of the pension fund. This is partially offset
because the earnings of the fund are eventually paid to the employee as
"income", which is all taxable, instead of as capital gain, only 50% of which
is taxable.
2. The employee will probably be in a lower tax bracket after retirement than
during his career. Thus he pays a lower rate of tax on his pension than on
money not contributed to a pension plan.
Deferred Profit Sharing Plan
1. Defined: ss. 248(1), 147(1).
2. The plan must be registered to gain tax advantages. The prerequisites for
registration are stated in s. 147(2-5). Generally, the plan must provide:
(i) that a trustee shall hold the money;
(ii) that no investment may be made in the employer's company;
(iii) that the employee's interest is not assignable or surrenderable;
(iv) that the employee has vested rights after five years of employment;
(v) that employees will be informed of their rights;
(vi) for death benefits should the employee die before his retirement;
(vii) that capital gains and losses be allocated to employees at market value.
3. If the plan is registered:
(i) the employer's deductions are the lesser of $2,500. per employee per
year and 20% of the employee's salary: ss. 18(l)(j), 20(1)(y). 60(k),
147(8,9);
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(ii) the income of the trust is exempt from tax: ss. 147(7), 149 (1)(s); except
there is a 1% tax penalty on foreign property holdings which exceed 10%
of all holdings: ss. 205-07; investment in "non-qualified investments" is
taxed: ss. 198-204;
(iii) benefits paid to employees are "income": ss. 56(1)(i); 60(a), (in), (n),
(1); 61(1); 61(2)(a)(iv); 147(10-12); Income Tax Application Rules, s. 40
for lump sum payments.
RegisteredRetirement Savings Plan.
1. Defined: ss. 146(l)(i)(J); 248(1). Generally, it is any contract for the sale of a
life annuity to an individual. The annuitant's employer need not be involved.
To be accepted for registration the plan must provide that benefits are not
assignable or surrenderable.
2. If it is registered:
(i) the annuitant's contributions are deductible up to $4,000. or 20% of
income: ss. 60(i,1), 146(5);
(ii) no tax is paid by a trust on its RRSP fund: ss. 146(1) (e,g), 146(4),
146(10), 205-07;
(iii) benefits paid are taxable: ss. 56(1)(h); 60(a), (1), (in), (n); 61(2)(d);
146(8).
Employees' ProfitSharingPlan
1. The plan must qualify under the definition in ss. 144(1), 248(1).
2. Contributions are deductible: s. 20 (1)(w); 144(5).
3. The amounts allocated to the employees each year are taxable: ss. 6(1)(d);
81(1)(k), 144(3-4). If the employee forfeits the pension before vesting the tax
is refundable: s. 144(9).
4. The earnings of the fund are not taxable: ss. 144(2), 149(1)(p).
5. The benefits paid to employees generally are not taxable: ss. 61(1),
61(2)(a)(iii), 144(6-7); Income Tax Application Rules, s. 40 for lump sum
payments.
PensionPlan
1. Prerequisites for registration: s. 248(1) - definition of "registered pension
fund or plan"; see passim throughout this paper for the standards required by
the Department of National Revenue in Circular 72-13R2.
2. If it is registered:
(i) The employer's contributions are deductible up to $2,500. per year per
employee: ss. 20(1)(q-s); 6(1)(a).
(ii) The employee's contributions are deductible up to $2,500. per year: ss,
8(l)(m), 8(6-8).
(iii) The income and capital gains of the fund are not taxable: ss. 149(1)(o),
205-07.
(iv) Benefits paid are taxable: ss. 56(1)(a); 60(a), (j), (m-n). See Income Tax
Application Rules, s. 40 for lump sum payments.

